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LAW AND THE RISE OF THE FIRM
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Organizational law empowers firms to hold assets and enter contracts as entities that are
legally distinct from their owners and managers. Legal scholars and economists have
commented extensively on one form of this partitioning between firms and owners:
namely, the rule of limited liability that insulates firm owners from business debts. But
a less-noticed form of legal partitioning, which we call "entity shielding," is both
economically and historically more significant than limited liability. While limited
liability shields owners' personal assets from a firm's creditors, entity shielding protects
firm assets from the owners' personal creditors (and from creditors of other business
ventures), thus reserving those assets for the firm's creditors. Entity shielding creates
important economic benefits, including a lower cost of credit for firm owners, reduced
bankruptcy administration costs, enhanced stability, and the possibility of a market in
shares. But entity shielding also imposes costs by requiring specialized legal and
business institutions and inviting opportunism vis-d-vis both personal and business
creditors. The changing balance of these benefits and costs illuminates the evolution of
legal entities across time and societies. To both illustrate and test this proposition, we
describe the development of entity shielding in four historical epochs: ancient Rome, the
Italian Middle Ages, England of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, and the United
States from the nineteenth century to the present.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic activity in modern societies is dominated not by indi-
viduals, but by firms that own assets, enter contracts, and incur liabili-
ties that are legally separate from those of their owners and managers.
A universal characteristic of these modern business firms is that they
enjoy the legal power to commit assets that bond their agreements
with their creditors and, correlatively, to shield those assets from the
claims of their owners' personal creditors. This legal characteristic -
which two of us previously termed affirmative asset partitioning,' and
which we here call entity shielding2 - has deep but largely unexam-
ined roots in the history of Western commercial law. In this Article we
analyze, in economic terms, the evolution of commercial entity shield-
ing from Roman times to the present. Our object is not only to under-
stand the past, but also to shed light on the foundations of modern
business entities and on their likely course of future development.
Previous work on the legal history of firms has focused on limited
liability - a form of owner shielding that, by protecting personal as-
sets of firm owners from the claims of firm creditors, is the functional
inverse of entity shielding. Although the matter is complex, we believe
that this emphasis is misplaced. While limited liability has evident
and important functional complementarities to entity shielding, it is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the creation of business firms as
separate and distinct economic actors. Firms can prosper without lim-
ited liability, but significant enterprises lacking entity shielding are
largely unknown in modern times.
A critical historical question is why entity shielding appeared
where and when it did. We take steps toward an answer by analyzing
four Western commercial societies: ancient Rome, medieval and Ren-
aissance Italy, early modern England, and the contemporary United
States. We view the analytical relationship between history and eco-
nomics bidirectionally. On the one hand, we seek an initial explana-
tion of the incidence of entity shielding by making a qualitative tally of
its likely economic costs and benefits within each society. At the same
time, we also use the historical record to deepen our understanding of
which economic costs associated with entity shielding were most im-
portant in constraining and shaping its development.
We begin by describing entity shielding and outlining its economic
benefits and costs. We then conduct our historical survey. We con-
1 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, i Io
YALE L.J. 387, 393-95 (2000).
2 We also discuss entity shielding in Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire,
The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, I 1-13.
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clude by describing the relationship between the economics of entity
shielding and the policy challenges that will shape the future evolution
of the commercial firm.
II. ASSET PARTITIONING AND ENTITY SHIELDING
A variety of sanctions have been used across history to enforce con-
tracts, including debtor's prison and enslavement. The principal sanc-
tion employed by modern legal systems, however, is permitting an un-
paid creditor to seize assets owned by the defaulting promisor. When
an individual enters into a contract, modern law in effect inserts a de-
fault term by which the individual pledges all his personal property to
bond his performance. A similar legal rule applies to business corpora-
tions: unless the contract states otherwise, all assets owned by the cor-
poration bond its obligations. Individuals (or rather, their personal es-
tates) and corporations are thus both examples of legal entities, a term
we use to refer to legally distinct pools of assets that provide security
to a fluctuating group of creditors and thus can be used to bond an in-
dividual's or business firm's contracts.
3
Special legal rules, which we term rules of asset partitioning,4 are
required to determine which entities bond which contracts, and which
assets belong to which entities. Often, the asset partitioning between
entities is complete: the creditors of one entity may not levy on assets
held by another. But asset partitioning can also be partial, as in the
modern general partnership: personal creditors of partners may levy on
firm assets, but only if the partnership creditors have first been paid in
full. As this example suggests, the separation between the assets of a
commercial firm and those of its owners comes in two forms, depend-
ing on which set of assets is being shielded from which group of credi-
tors. We label the two forms entity shielding and owner shielding.
A. Entity Shielding as the Foundation of Legal Entities
The term entity shielding refers to rules that protect a firm's assets
from the personal creditors of its owners. In modern legal entities, en-
tity shielding takes three forms:
Weak entity shielding grants firm creditors priority over personal
creditors in the division of firm assets, meaning that the personal
creditors of owners may levy on firm assets, but only if the firm credi-
3 When an individual enters into a contract, the new promisee joins the group of creditors
whose claims are backed by the individual's assets. And when an individual satisfies his contrac-
tual obligation to a promisee, that promisee leaves this group of creditors. In effect, the security
afforded by the individual's assets "floats" over a shifting set of creditors.
4 We previously introduced this term in Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 393-94.
1337200o6]
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tors have first been paid in full. As noted, this rule characterizes the
modern general partnership.
Strong entity shielding adds a rule of liquidation protection5 to the
protections of weak entity shielding. Liquidation protection restricts
the ability of both firm owners and their personal creditors to force the
payout of an owner's share of the firm's net assets. The restriction on
firm owners is conceptually distinct from the restriction on personal
creditors, but for reasons we will explore these traits usually come
paired. The modern business corporation provides a familiar example
of strong entity shielding: not only do corporate creditors enjoy a prior
claim to the corporation's assets, but they are also protected from at-
tempts by a shareholder or his personal creditors to liquidate those
assets.
6
Complete entity shielding denies non-firm creditors - including
creditors of the firm's (beneficial) owners, if any - any claim to firm
assets. Common contemporary examples of entities with this trait in-
clude nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts. The personal credi-
tors of the managers and beneficiaries of such an organization do not
enjoy any claim to its assets, which only bond contractual commit-
ments made in the name of the organization itself.
All entity forms used by modern commercial firms exhibit entity
shielding. And, as we explain below, 7 entity shielding, unlike owner
shielding, can be achieved only through the special property rules of
entity law. For this reason, we believe that entity shielding is the sine
qua non of the legal entity,8 and we divide legal entities into weak enti-
ties, strong entities, and complete entities based on the degree of entity
shielding they provide. 9
5 We previously introduced this term in id. at 403-04.
6 Corporation statutes generally require that a majority or supermajority of shareholders vote
to authorize dissolution. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (2001). Thus, only a creditor
seizing shares constituting a majority also possesses the power to force a corporate liquidation.
7 See infra section II.C, pp. 1340-43.
8 Previous literature has described organizational forms using various terms, including "legal
entities," "legal persons," and "juridical persons." The definitions offered for each are various and
vague, and scholars have disputed the set of entities included in each definition. For example,
there is ongoing debate over whether and when the general partnership became a legal entity. See
ROSCOE T. STEFFEN & THOMAS R. KERR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY-PARTNER-
SHIP 21 (4 th ed. I98O) (collecting sources). We believe that by equating the term "legal entity"
with the presence of entity shielding, we create a nomenclature that is easy to apply and that cap-
tures the primary purpose of entity law. This approach settles the controversy about the partner-
ship: it is an entity, albeit a weak one, and has been so under Anglo-American law since it ac-
quired a rule of weak entity shielding more than 300 years ago.
9 While the Anglo-American legal literature has heretofore had no name for the concepts that
we term entity shielding and asset partitioning and has - surprisingly - largely neglected these
concepts in general, the civil law literature is more self-conscious about the issue. In particular,
the civil law has long deployed the concept of a separate fund or separate patrimony. This con-
cept comprises a broad and somewhat vague category of arrangement commonly described - in
1338 [VoL1.19:1333
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B. Forms of Owner Shielding
In contrast to entity shielding, owner shielding refers to the rules
that protect the personal assets of a firm's owners from the firm's
creditors. Owner shielding is not central to the purpose of legal enti-
ties in the way that entity shielding is. Not all modern entity forms
provide owner shielding, the most conspicuous example being the
modern American general partnership, which since 1978 has allowed
partnership creditors to lay claim to the partners' personal assets in
bankruptcy on equal footing with the partners' personal creditors. 10
Owner shielding is also significantly easier to achieve by contract, and
thus without resort to the fiat of a legal form, than is entity shielding.
Nonetheless, owner shielding has an important supporting role to play
in the story of legal entities, and we therefore describe a few forms that
it can take:
Weak owner shielding is the mirror image of weak entity shielding;
it grants priority to personal creditors over firm creditors in the divi-
sion of the owners' personal assets. Weak owner shielding character-
ized general partnerships in the United States for two centuries prior
to 1978 and continues to characterize English partnerships today.'
the most general terms - as involving a group of assets set apart for a particular purpose. Credi-
tors' rights are an important consideration in determining the presence (or consequences) of a
separate fund, and the presence of a separate fund is commonly considered an aspect of the much-
disputed concept of a juridical person, though the presence of a separate fund does not necessarily
indicate a distinct juridical person. See, e.g., Lina Bigliazzi Geri, Patrimonio autonomo e
separato, in 32 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 280 (1982). Consequently, situations said to in-
volve a separate fund often in application parallel those that, in our terminology, involve asset
partitioning, and in particular seem to include arrangements that involve entity shielding. We
focus here on a narrower range of institutions - principally commercial firms - and seek to of-
fer, by means of the several degrees of entity shielding and owner shielding that we identify, a
clearer and more refined categorization of the ways in which one set of assets is "separated" from
another. Beyond this, we offer a functional (more precisely, an economic) analysis of entity shield-
ing and its evolution that is largely absent from the civil law literature. See also Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note i, at 438-39.
10 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 723, 92 Stat. 2549, 26o6-07
(codified at ii U.S.C. § 723 (2o00)).
11 See Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179 (1857) (articulating a rule of weak owner shielding
in the United States); STEFFEN & KERR, supra note 8, at 8o6 (noting that Rodgers v. Meranda
formulated the majority rule in the United States prior to 1978); Larry E. Ribstein, The Important
Role of Non-Organization Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 774 (2oo5) (noting that Great
Britain has retained "dual priorities" or the "jingle rule"). There are two important variants of
weak owner shielding. In one, which characterized the general partnership in the United States
before 1978, the owners of the firm are jointly and severally liable for all firm debt, although their
personal creditors enjoy a prior claim on their assets. In the other, which characterized California
business corporations from 1849 to 193 I, each owner is responsible only for his proportional share
of firm debt. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabil-
ity for Corporate Torts, loo YALE L.J. 1879, 1924-25 (i99i). Tradable shares will tend to be more
liquid when a firm has pro rata, rather than joint and several, owner liability - although, as we
will show in later sections, historical examples of firms with both joint and several liability and
tradable shares can be found.
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Complete owner shielding fully severs the claims of firm creditors
to the personal assets of owners, thereby restricting those creditors to
the assets held by the firm itself. A familiar example is the rule of lim-
ited shareholder liability in modern business corporations. We use the
terms complete owner shielding and limited liability interchangeably
in this Article. 12
C. Entity Shielding Requires Law; Owner Shielding Does Not
Although the concepts of entity shielding and owner shielding are
both important for understanding the pattern of creditors' rights in
modern business firms, only entity shielding clearly requires special
rules of law. Owner shielding, by contrast, can often be achieved
through contract.
It would be practically impossible in most types of firm to create
effective entity shielding without special rules of law. Entity shielding
in general limits the rights of personal creditors by subordinating their
claims on firm assets, and strong entity shielding additionally impairs
the ability of personal creditors to liquidate firm assets. Although a
firm's owners in theory could achieve either of these results by negoti-
ating for the requisite waivers in all contracts with their personal
creditors, the negotiation of such waivers - beyond involving high
transaction costs - would be fraught with moral hazard. 13  Each
waiver would improve the position of firm creditors and thus benefit
all firm owners by decreasing the firm's borrowing costs. But each
waiver would also increase personal borrowing costs, and that cost
would be borne entirely by the owner who negotiated the waiver.
Each owner would thus face an incentive to act opportunistically by
omitting the waivers from personal dealings. Moreover, other owners
and firm creditors would find such omissions costly to police, given the
significant freedom individuals enjoy in their personal dealings. A lar-
ger number of owners exacerbates the problem by making monitoring
more difficult and by heightening the conflict between personal and
collective interests. And the policing problem is further compounded
if ownership shares are freely transferable. These problems can be
solved only by impairing the rights of personal creditors without their
contractual consent (and often even without notice). Doing that re-
12 We have assigned the labels "weak" and "complete" to these two forms of owner shielding to
reflect symmetry with the similarly named forms of entity shielding. We do not include "strong"
owner shielding because the pattern of rights that it would entail - firm creditors enjoying a
subordinated claim on the firm owners' personal assets but not an ability to force liquidation of
those assets - is not found among standard legal entity types.
13 This analysis is explored at greater length in Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Prop-
erty, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 3'
J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 406-07 (2oo2).
1340 [Vol. 1 19:I1333
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quires a special rule of property law for assets committed to the firm. 14
Entity law provides that rule.
By contrast, owners can endow a firm with a substantial degree of
owner shielding - and limited, liability in particular - by requiring
firm agents (including the owners themselves when they act on behalf
of the firm) to negotiate clauses in the firm's contracts whereby firm
creditors agree to limit or waive their right to levy on the owners' per-
sonal assets. 15  Although this system also entails some moral hazard,
the effect is relatively modest. While the cost of omitting the requisite
waiver is spread among all owners in the form of increased risk to
their personal assets, the benefit of lower firm borrowing costs is
shared among them as well, reducing the opportunity for each owner
to profit at the expense of the others. 16  Moreover, if basic rules of
agency law apply, owners can protect themselves by specifying that the
authority of firm agents to bind the owners extends only to firm assets
and not to personal assets. The effectiveness of this approach can be
enhanced by inserting terms such as "limited" into the firm's name and
letterhead to notify third parties that the authority of firm agents is
circumscribed. That was, in fact, the approach used by many English
joint stock companies before English common and statutory law made
limited liability the default rule for such firms.'
7
Our assertion that entity law is necessary for the liquidation protec-
tion that characterizes strong entities such as the corporation requires
a qualification. We have defined liquidation protection to comprise
two components: liquidation protection against owners, which denies
owners the right to make unilateral withdrawals from their share of
firm assets; and liquidation protection against creditors, which bars the
personal creditors of an owner from forcing asset withdrawals to sat-
isfy the owner's personal debts. 8 Although entity law has some role to
14 For a comparison of property law and contract law, see id. at 409-15.
15 We are referring here to contractual liability only. Limited liability toward most tort claim-
ants, which is today a universal attribute of business corporations, is by nature nonconsensual and
thus could not be achieved by contract alone. Limited liability toward involuntary creditors,
however, has been relatively unimportant to the economics of business firms until very recently,
and there is reason to doubt its efficiency. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note ii.
16 As others have pointed out, the symmetry we describe between personal costs and personal
benefits can break down because an adverse selection problem may arise - shares in a firm
without limited liability will be more valuable to the poor than to the wealthy. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 89,
94-95 (I985). Our point is not that creating owner shielding by contract eliminates incentive
problems, but rather that the problems are more acute in the case of entity shielding. While the
benefits of waiving entity shielding are entirely concentrated upon the contracting party, the bene-
fits of waiving owner shielding are largely externalized to other owners.
17 It was some time, however, before the English courts gave their clear blessing to this ap-
proach. See infra p. 1381.
18 In a previous work, two of us focused principally on liquidation protection against creditors
as defining strong entity shielding (there termed "strong form" affirmative asset partitioning). See
1341
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play in securing both attributes, it is important primarily for shielding
firm assets from personal creditors. As far back as we can see, busi-
ness partners commonly entered into enforceable agreements among
themselves not to withdraw from a firm prior to a defined term or
without common consent., 9 Here as elsewhere, courts were sometimes
reluctant to enforce perpetual restrictions on the free alienation of
property. In addition, sanctions for breach often are limited to prov-
able damages, which can be inadequate to deter inefficient withdraw-
als. 20  Strong entities such as the corporation, whose shield against
owner withdrawals is enforceable in perpetuity, thus offer a more se-
cure commitment than partnership agreements. But the role of entity
law in providing liquidation protection against owners is nonetheless
one of degree rather than kind. By contrast, special rules of entity law
are essential for liquidation protection against creditors because a mere
contract among owners to waive their withdrawal rights would not
bind their personal creditors. Furthermore, attempts to secure con-
tractual waivers from the creditors themselves would be hindered by
the moral hazard already described. For analogous reasons, firms may
need special rules of entity law to deny withdrawal rights to involun-
tary transferees2l such as the owner's heirs.22
Scholars have argued recently that the corporate form's historical
importance lies principally in the fact that it, unlike the partnership,
provided liquidation protection against owners and thereby enabled
owners to lock in their investments.23 We agree with these commenta-
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note I, at 434-35. We observed, however, that liquidation protec-
tion against owners in its more extreme forms arguably requires law as well. See id. at 435.
Thus, the two forms of liquidation protection are highly complementary, and liquidation protec-
tion against owners can be properly considered an element of asset partitioning. See id.
19 See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, i BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 183, 193-94 (2004) (dis-
cussing the enforceability of withdrawals from partnerships).
20 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight
of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression lo (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10,900, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papersl
w10900.
21 The right to examine a firm's articles of association arguably provides voluntary transferees,
such as purchasers of shares, with sufficient notice of restrictions on withdrawal rights, making
special legal rules unnecessary for this purpose. On the other hand, providing for a form such as
the business corporation in which liquidation protection against creditors is the default legal rule
would facilitate regular trading on anonymous markets. A default provides low-cost notice to all
owners and creditors - including both business and personal creditors - of the nature of the
liquidation rights involved. For a general analysis of the role of law in structuring property
rights, with emphasis on the issue of notice (more properly, verification) and with further discus-
sion of situations analogous to those involved here, see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13.
22 Margaret Blair provides evidence that a desire to constrain the rights of an owner's heirs
was an important reason for preferring corporations to partnerships in the United States during
the nineteenth century. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 446 (2oo3).
23 See id.; Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 7-11.
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tors - indeed, it has long been conventional wisdom2 4 - that investor
lock-in is an important function of the corporate form. But, as we in-
dicate above, neither the corporation nor any other entity form is a
prerequisite for liquidation protection against owners. Liquidation
protection against creditors, in comparison, clearly depends on the spe-
cial rules of property law that characterize legal entities. Moreover,
the economic benefits of liquidation protection against owners are
highly circumscribed unless backstopped by liquidation protection
against creditors. For these reasons, our theoretical and historical
analysis of strong entities such as the corporation emphasizes the es-
sential role played by such entities in shielding firm assets from the
personal creditors of the firm's owners.
In summary, the primary virtue of legal entities is that they impose
property rules that slice through the obstacles to pursuing entity
shielding by contract. But this virtue is also a potential vice, since a
legal device that enables an individual to impair the rights of creditors
without their consent invites abuse. In the next section we discuss the
nature of that abuse, as well as other aspects of entity shielding's costs
and benefits.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF ENTITY SHIELDING
Although the benefits of owner shielding in the form of limited li-
ability have been well rehearsed in the literature, 25 comparatively little
attention has been paid to the economics of entity shielding. We exam-
ine the economics of entity shielding here. The costs and benefits we
identify are vital to understanding both the evolution of legal entities
through history and the policy tradeoffs that organizational law pre-
sents today.
A. The Benefits of Entity Shielding
Enabling individuals to organize legally distinct asset pools pro-
vides important economic benefits by reducing information costs for
prospective lenders and solving problems associated with joint owner-
ship. The first three benefits that we describe here require only prior-
24 See, e.g., NORMAN D. LATTIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS 15-16 (2d ed. 1971); JONA-
THAN SOBELOFF, TAX AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ASPECTS OF SMALL BUSINESS (4 th
ed. 1974), reprinted in DAVID R. HERWITZ, CORPORATIONS COURSE GAME PLAN 30, 36-37
(1975).
25 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4o-62 (199I); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 93-97; Paul
Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. I 17, 147-49 (198o); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
i, at 428-39; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note ii, at 1919-20; Susan E. Woodward, Limited
Liability in the Theory of the Firm, i4i J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 6oi (985).
THE RISE OF THE FIRM 13432006]
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ity of claim for firm creditors, and thus are advantages of all forms of
entity shielding. The remaining benefits result primarily from liquida-
tion protection, and thus generally arise only in strong entities such as
the business corporation.
i. Lower Creditor Monitoring Costs. - All forms of entity shield-
ing reduce creditor monitoring costs by protecting creditors from risks
they cannot easily evaluate. We explain this point through use of a
historical hypothetical.26
Imagine a Florentine merchant of the Middle Ages who is a partner
in several partnerships. 27 Among these are a wool cloth manufactur-
ing partnership in Florence, a commodity trading partnership in
Bruges, and a banking partnership in Rome. Suppose further that the
law does not provide entity shielding to partnerships. 28 If the default
rule among partners is joint and several liability for partnership debt
(which was the case then as now), creditors of the Bruges firm would
have the right to levy on all assets owned by the Florentine merchant
wherever located, including his shares of the firms in Florence and
Rome. Thus, a failure of the trading firm in Bruges to pay its debts
would threaten the security available to creditors of the partnerships in
both Florence and Rome. And because of our assumption that the
partnerships in Florence and Rome lack entity shielding, the claims as-
serted against them by the creditors of the failed Bruges partnership
would be equal in priority to the claims of those partnerships' own
creditors. To determine the creditworthiness of the Florence manufac-
turing firm, a would-be creditor - such as a raw wool supplier selling
on credit - would thus need to assess not only that firm's prospects,
but also the prospects of the trading firm in Bruges and the banking
firm in Rome. But obtaining information about businesses in Bruges
and Rome would likely be costly for a creditor in Florence, and a raw
wool supplier would likely be in a better position to evaluate a firm in
the cloth manufacturing industry than to evaluate firms in the banking
or trading industries. In short, without entity shielding, a creditor of a
firm is vulnerable to the fortunes of all business and personal affairs of
all firm owners, regardless of his capacity to monitor those affairs.
If, however, the partnership in Florence were endowed with entity
shielding, even in just the weak form, a would-be creditor of that firm
could focus principally on evaluating that firm's own assets and pros-
pects. He would need to be less concerned with the affairs of opera-
26 For a more thorough treatment, see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 398-403.
27 The Medici family's businesses, for example, were organized in this manner. See infra pp.
1373-74. So were those of Francesco Datini. See IRIS ORIGO, THE MERCHANT OF PRATO
109-14 (Penguin Books 1992) (1957).
28 We discuss the actual state of medieval law on these and other matters in infra section V.B,
pp. 1366-72.
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tions in Rome and Bruges because creditors of those firms would be
able to levy on the assets of the partnership in Florence only after he
had been paid in full. In short, entity shielding would dedicate the
Florence partnership's assets principally to that partnership's own
creditors. Although this necessarily distributes value away from the
creditors of the Bruges and Rome partnerships, that effect can be off-
set if those partnerships are also given entity shielding. By this means,
all creditors could enjoy a reduction in the cost of appraising the secu-
rity of their claims, permitting in turn a decrease in each firm's cost of
credit. Entity shielding thus promotes specialization, permitting credi-
tors to limit the risks they face to those businesses that they know par-
ticularly well or that they can monitor with particular 
ease.2 9
Limited liability and other forms of owner shielding have the con-
verse effect because they distribute the value of non-firm assets away
from the firm's creditors. This too can reduce monitoring costs.
30  But
owner shielding does not protect a firm's assets from non-firm credi-
tors. Endowing our hypothetical Florence partnership with limited li-
ability, for example, would not prevent the creditors of the Bruges and
Rome partnerships from asserting claims to the Florence partnership's
assets equal in priority to the claims of the Florence partnership's
creditors, and consequently would not reduce monitoring costs for the
Florence firm's creditors to the same degree that entity shielding
would. 3' As between the two main forms of asset partitioning, then,
entity shielding is the more effective for demarcating a subset of assets
and pledging them to a specialized group of creditors.
29 On the same principle, a firm and its owners can often reduce the monitoring costs of credi-
tors if the firm's assets (already protected from personal creditors) can be subpartitioned again
and pledged to subsets of business creditors with specialized lending expertise in particular lines
of business. This benefit is one of the principal reasons for the formation of wholly owned corpo-
rate subsidiaries and other special-purpose entities. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 
i, at
399-401.
30 Owner shielding will reduce creditor monitoring costs if non-firm creditors enjoy an infor-
mational advantage in non-firm assets for the same reason that entity shielding creates 
value if
firm creditors have an advantage in firm assets.
31 It might be objected that endowing all the firms with limited liability would achieve the
same result as does endowing them with entity shielding. For example, if the firms in Bruges 
and
Rome both featured limited liability, then creditors of those firms would have no right to proceed
against the other assets of the Florentine merchant, and thus they would have no claim to 
his
share of the partnership in Florence. But to consider this approach reliable, a creditor of 
the
Florence partnership would have to verify that the Bruges and Rome firms had and maintained
limited liability, which is likely to be expensive from a distance. Moreover, the creditor in Flor-
ence would continue to face the risk that the Florentine merchant might form yet another firm
lacking limited liability, personally guarantee the debt of the Bruges or Rome firms, 
or run up
non-business, consumer debt. If, on the other hand, the firm in Florence were 
endowed with en-
tity shielding, the creditor of that firm would be protected against all of these possibilities. 
Con-
sequently, limited liability is not an adequate substitute for entity shielding in reducing 
the costs
of monitoring for firm creditors.
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2. Reduced Managerial Agency Costs. - By attaching creditor
rights to specific asset pools, all forms of entity shielding can reduce
the risk to firm owners that a firm agent will engage in excessive bor-
rowing. To illustrate, imagine again our wealthy Florentine merchant
who funds a textile firm in Florence, a commodity trading firm in
Bruges, and a bank in Rome. The merchant can choose between two
partnership structures: a single, large partnership in which each of the
three shops' managers is a copartner; or three two-person partnerships,
one for each local manager and shop, with each local partnership pro-
viding entity shielding. If the merchant fears that his manager-
partners will borrow too much on the firm's account (for either busi-
ness or personal purposes), the merchant will often prefer the three-
partnership structure. Under the single-partnership structure, each
manager-partner could offer to bond his debt with the assets of all
three shops. By contrast, under the three-partnership structure, credi-
tors who deal with each manager-partner will enjoy a prior claim only
to the assets in that manager's shop, while their claim to assets in the
other shops will be subordinated. In case of a bankruptcy, then, entity
shielding will increase the degree to which the creditors of a particular
shop must bear the costs of excessive borrowing by that shop's man-
ager. Knowing this, these creditors will often be more restrained in
their lending ex ante, thereby effectively disciplining the deviant man-
ager.32
In this example, creditor rights are used to reduce the principal eq-
uity holder's agency costs. We do not know how important entity
shielding was as a device for controlling agency costs in this fashion as
a historical matter. With respect to the modern world, however,
George Triantis has made the related argument that equity carve-outs,
which give minority shareholders a stake in corporate subsidiaries, can
reduce agency costs by limiting the ability of the parent company's
management to shift assets among subsidiaries. 33
3. Reduced Administrative Costs of Bankruptcy. - Just as all
forms of entity shielding enable creditors to specialize in particular as-
set pools, they also enable bankruptcy courts to specialize, with com-
32 The merchant could limit the borrowing of his individual managers even more tightly if he
could organize each of his shops as a corporation that accorded him and the other shops the pro-
tection of limited liability. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 425. Of course, medie-
val Florentine merchants did not enjoy the option of incorporating, although in the fifteenth cen-
tury they did enjoy access to another limited liability form, the accomandita. We discuss medieval
organizational law in detail in infra Part V.
33 See George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of
Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1 102,
1124-27, 1134-35 (2004). Of course, on Triantis's account, it is minority shareholder rights - not
creditor rights - that serve as the instrument for tying the hands of managers and thereby limit-
ing agency costs.
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parable benefits. To illustrate, let us continue with our example of the
medieval Florentine merchant and consider the implications of a fail-
ure of his banking firm in Rome to pay its debts. Assume that - as
was typical practice then as now 34 - the bankruptcy court in Rome
employs a pro rata rule, under which each creditor who files a proper
claim receives a fraction of the debtor's assets equal to the creditor's
proportionate share of the firm's total liabilities.
35 Thus, to ensure a
proper payout according to the pro rata regime, the Rome bankruptcy
court would have to assess not only the value of the Rome banking
firm, but also the ratios between assets and debts of the firms in Flor-
ence and Bruges. To omit this step might impair the rights of the
creditors of the Florence and Bruges firms, as those creditors would (in
the absence of entity shielding) enjoy equal claims to all of the Floren-
tine merchant's assets wherever found, and the Florence and Bruges
firms might be in even worse financial shape than the Rome firm. The
other partners of the Rome firm would also probably have their own
creditors from outside business and personal dealings, and the court
would similarly need to factor the value of those creditors' claims into
the payout calculation. Even if a bankruptcy court in Rome could ex-
ercise jurisdiction over all of these assets and creditors, the necessity of
assessing all relevant values in order to determine the proper payout to
each creditor would be highly costly in terms of time, judicial re-
sources, and the potential for error.
Endowing the firms with entity shielding would significantly alle-
viate these problems. Because the creditors of the Rome banking firm
would then enjoy a prior claim to firm assets, a bankruptcy court in
Rome could begin distributions to firm creditors as soon as it had
evaluated the Rome firm's assets and debts without concern that this
might compromise the rights of creditors elsewhere. Even if firm as-
sets remained after firm creditors were paid - an unlikely event in
any case given that the firm has defaulted on its debt - those assets
could be distributed to creditors with subordinated claims, such as
those of the Florence and Bruges firms, in subsequent proceedings.
34 Pro rata payment of creditors was the clear rule of bankruptcy throughout Italy starting in
the thirteenth century. UMBERTO SANTARELLI, MERCANTI E SOCIETA TRA MERCANTI 83-
84 (2d ed. 1992).
35 The only other practical allocation rule that removes incentives for inefficient runs on a
firm's assets is one of temporal priority, in which a creditor who lent first is paid in 
full before
anything is paid to a creditor who lent later. Ancient Rome evidently used a variant of this 
rule,
id. at 83, but both medieval and contemporary courts rejected it, evidently for reasons of adminis-
trative simplicity. See UMBERTO SANTARELLI, PER LA STORIA DEL FALLIMENTO 
NELLE
LEGISLAZIONI ITALIANE DELL'ETA INTERMEDIA 264 (1964); infra p. 1366-67; infra p. 138o
(noting the emergence of early modern English pro rata bankruptcy). The advantages that entity
shielding offers to the administration of a pro rata bankruptcy system also extend to a 
bankruptcy
system that distributes assets based on temporal priority.
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The result would be a pro rata bankruptcy system that is less costly to
administer and that can begin paying creditors more quickly. And the
prospect of faster payments to creditors should, in turn, result in lower
borrowing costs. Carrying the thought experiment forward, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how a modern court could efficiently administer the
bankruptcy of a large public corporation without some means of sepa-
rating the corporation's assets and creditors from the myriad and far-
flung assets and creditors of the corporation's many shareholders. En-
tity shielding is that means.
4. Protection of Going-Concern Value. - When a rule of liquida-
tion protection is added to priority of claim for entity creditors -
thereby increasing the degree of entity shielding from weak to strong
- further benefits can be realized, perhaps the most important of
which is protection of a firm's going-concern value. 36  The right to
withdraw assets at will can be valuable to an owner of a firm. But the
cost of the destruction of going-concern value caused by withdrawal
would be spread across all owners, with the consequence that individ-
ual owners in a multi-owner firm would face an incentive to exercise
the withdrawal right when withdrawal is personally beneficial but so-
cially inefficient31 For this reason, firm owners often mutually agree
36 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 403-04. Going-concern value is the value of
the firm as an operating entity, as distinct from the "liquidation value" that the firm's assets
would fetch if sold.
Whenever a firm's assets are endowed with liquidation protection, we expect them also tobe subjected to priority of claim for firm creditors. There are several reasons for this. First, firm-
specific assets that call for liquidation protection are likely to be of the type that firm creditors arein the best position to value and monitor. Therefore, when liquidation protection is efficient, pri-
ority of claim for firm creditors in firm assets is likely to be efficient as well. Second, in a firm
with liquidation protection, firm creditors are likely to have de facto priority in firm assets. Anydistribution of assets to one owner will increase the burden on remaining owners to cover firmdebt, and firm owners will therefore tend to resist distributions of firm assets until firm creditorshave been paid in full. Finally, transferring to firm creditors priority of claim in the assets of afirm that has liquidation protection should create social value. This is because creditors will tend
to value assets more highly if those assets are available to the creditors immediately upon a de-fault event, and the consequence of liquidation protection is that firm creditors retain the ability
to levy on firm assets when their debtor (the firm) defaults, but personal creditors lose the ability
to levy on firm assets when their debtors (the owners) default.
This analysis seems to fit the facts, as we are unaware of an historical example of an entityform that provided liquidation protection but not priority of claim for firm creditors. For these
reasons, we define strong entity shielding to include both liquidation protection and priority of
claim for entity creditors.
On the other hand, as we explain below, liquidation protection entails costs that are not as-
sociated with priority of claim for entity creditors. Consequently, priority of claim may be effi-
cient in firms in which liquidation protection is not, an observation that seems to explain the con-tinuing demand for the pattern of entity shielding seen in weak entities such as the partnership.
37 The incentive to withdraw may arise from a sudden need for liquidity on the part of theindividual owner. But neither asymmetry of interests among owners nor a special need for liquid-ity is necessary for the threat of inefficient withdrawal to arise. Absent liquidation protection, aninefficient run on a firm's assets by its investors can develop whenever going-concern value is
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to waive their withdrawal rights for a specified period (as in a partner-
ship for a term) or until a majority of owners votes to liquidate (as in a
business corporation). The degree to which the cost of withdrawal is
externalized increases with the number of owners, making liquidation
protection more valuable as owners become more numerous. 38
To be fully efficient, the waiver of the withdrawal right must also
bind the owners' personal creditors. Otherwise, when an owner de-
faults on personal debt, that owner's creditors will face the same in-
centive to force an inefficient liquidation of firm shares. Moreover, if
waivers by owners of withdrawal rights do not bind personal creditors,
then each owner will face an incentive to engage in an inefficient level
of personal borrowing - in effect, to sell the withdrawal right at too
cheap a price - because part of the cost of each owner's personal in-
solvency will be externalized to the other owners. Thus, contemporary
entities that provide liquidation protection against owners also provide
liquidation protection against creditors. 39  For example, shareholders
of a modern business corporation cannot force liquidation of their in-
vestments unless they control a majority of shares. This rule also ap-
plies to a minority owner's personal creditors, who may - if the
owner defaults on personal debts - seize the owner's shares but not
the underlying corporate assets. We thus, as indicated above, 40 include
greater than liquidation value, owners have agreed that the payout to a withdrawing owner
should reflect the firm's going-concern value, and some owners believe, reasonably or not, that
other owners may withdraw their investments. The problem is a multi-person prisoner's di-
lemma. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 55-56 (1996).
38 By enabling firms to have more owners, liquidation protection also increases the amount of
capital that any particular firm can raise, and thus makes it less costly for a firm to achieve the
optimal scale associated with an asset-intensive production technology. Blair makes the converse
point about the traditional partnership when she notes that the problems associated with its lack
of liquidation protection increase as the partnership grows. See Blair, supra note 22, at 412.
39 We generally would not expect, and in fact find few examples of, firms with liquidation pro-
tection against creditors but not against owners. Liquidation protection makes sense only if its
benefits in terms of protecting going-concern value exceed its costs, which - as we explore more
fully infra section hI.B, pp. 135o-54 - consist of illiquidity and increased risk of exploitation by
control persons. By dint of their typical position as strangers to the firm, personal creditors are
more vulnerable to control-person opportunism than are a firm's owners. Consequently, liquida-
tion protection against creditors is likely to be inefficient in a firm if liquidation protection against
owners is inefficient as well. A rule of liquidation protection against creditors in the absence of
similar protection against owners thus might not provide significant social value, and courts
would have good reason to suspect that owners seeking such a rule intend merely to expropriate
personal creditors. Despite this line of analysis, we do note that American courts in the late nine-
teenth century began denying requests by personal creditors for the remedy of liquidation in cases
in which alternative remedies appeared adequate to safeguard the creditors' interests. This posi-
tion seemingly resulted from the increased confidence of American courts in their ability to pro-
tect those creditors by evaluating partnership interests and arbitrating internal partnership dis-
putes. See infra pp. 1388-89.
40 See supra p. 1338.
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liquidation protection against both owners and creditors in our defini-
tion of strong entity shielding.
5. Capital Accumulation and Investment Diversification. - By re-
ducing the need for a firm's owners to monitor one another's non-firm
financial affairs, entity shielding reduces the costs to owners of bring-
ing on additional equity investors, especially when they are not family,
friends, or others who are particularly easy to monitor or trust. Entity
shielding thus makes it easier for individuals to make equity invest-
ments in multiple firms, and hence to diversify risk. While this is true
for all types of entity shielding, it is particularly true for strong entity
shielding because of the advantages of liquidation protection.
6. Transferable Shares. - For the same reason that liquidation
protection reduces the need for owners to monitor one another's per-
sonal affairs, it also reduces the importance of restrictions on who may
become an owner, and thus promotes free transferability of shares. Al-
though previous commentators have claimed that limited liability is
the foundation of share transferability,41 limited liability is in fact nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for that purpose. It is unnecessary be-
cause pro rata shareholder liability is consistent with a liquid market
in shares; firms with unlimited liability have been traded in public
markets into the twentieth century.42 And it is insufficient because,
unlike strong entity shielding, it does not neutralize the risk that shares
will end up in the hands of individuals likely to threaten the firm's go-
ing-concern value through excessive personal borrowing.43 It is there-
fore not surprising that, though firms with freely tradable shares have
sometimes lacked limited liability, it appears that they have always
had strong entity shielding.
B. The Costs of Entity Shielding
If entity shielding in commercial firms brought nothing but bene-
fits, we might expect to find firms with entity shielding throughout his-
tory. But as we explain in our historical sections, commercial firms
with entity shielding arose only gradually, appearing at first in circum-
scribed contexts and forms. This suggests that entity shielding brings
significant costs as well as benefits. We survey here the costs that
seem most important.
41 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 42; Woodward, supra note 25, at
6oi.
42 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 41-42 (1987); Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note ii, at 1895; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and
Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV i565, 1574-84 (1991).
43 Even weak entity shielding would promote marketability of shares to some extent, given
that free transferability exacerbates the costs to firm creditors of assessing the personal finances of
firm owners.
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i. Debtor Opportunism. - Entity shielding invites opportunistic
behavior by allowing a debtor to subordinate his creditors without
their consent. The upshot may be that the availability of entity shield-
ing increases rather than decreases the overall cost of borrowing.
Suppose, for example, that our hypothetical Florentine merchant or-
ganized his three firms as partnerships providing weak entity shielding
but not owner shielding. After investing assets in one partnership and
causing that partnership to issue debt, the merchant could profit by
shifting those same assets to another partnership and using them to at-
tract more creditors, effectively "selling" the assets twice. Expecting
such opportunistic behavior ex post, creditors of the first partnership
might not offer better credit terms than they would in the absence of
entity shielding, and indeed might increase the interest rate they
charge to reflect the risk that their claims will end up subordinated. A
modern merchant might employ a variation on the same theme (or
scheme) by committing assets to a corporation, issuing corporate debt,
and then shifting the assets to a corporate subsidiary that also borrows
against them. In short, freedom to construct entities creates the poten-
tial for the same forms of opportunism toward creditors as does free-
dom to grant security interests, but on a much broader scale.
Owner shielding invites the reverse form of opportunism, in which
an owner withdraws assets from an entity to the detriment of entity
creditors. This is the principal hazard associated with limited liability,
and a familiar one. As just illustrated with our hypothetical Floren-
tine merchant, however, the incentive to remove assets from a firm
opportunistically also arises in firms with entity shielding even in the
absence of limited liability.
The chances that owners will be able to shift assets opportunisti-
cally either into the firm (which entity shielding encourages) or out of
it (which limited liability encourages) depend on several factors, per-
haps the most important of which is the number of owners. An en-
tity's owners are unlikely to permit one another to shift assets oppor-
tunistically unless the result is mutually beneficial, suggesting that
opportunistic asset-shifting of both types should decrease as the num-
ber of owners rises. But opportunistic movement of personal assets
into rather than out of an entity should be particularly unlikely when
the entity has numerous owners. A firm's owners are (proportionately)
in the same position with respect to the firm's creditors, so that one
owner's incentive to exploit firm creditors will likely be shared by the
others and thus lead to an opportunistic pro rata distribution to all
owners. That one owner has an interest in exploiting his personal
creditors by increasing his investment in the firm, however, does not
suggest that the other owners have reason to do likewise or to enable
such exploitation by accepting downward readjustments of their rela-
tive ownership shares. The greater ease of using a single-owner entity
than a multi-owner entity to exploit personal creditors explains why
1351200o6]
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the rise of single-owner firms presents some of the most important
challenges in organizational law today.
The movement of assets across entity borders need not be malicious
for entity shielding to generate costs. Although deliberate opportunism
may be the bigger problem, mere confusion and uncertainty regarding
the propriety of a firm's investments and distributions can occasion
wasteful disputes and delay in settling creditors' claims. When the
means of delineating and enforcing the distinction between firm and
personal assets are weak, giving firm creditors priority in firm assets
may be less efficient than creating no priorities at all.
2. Higher Enforcement Costs. - Rules to prevent opportunism
and confusion must be credible to be effective. Establishing credibility
gives rise to enforcement costs. For example, minimum capital re-
quirements entail accounting and disclosure obligations, monitoring
activity by creditors, and litigation of perceived violations.
Bright-line rules for the use of a legal entity may reduce opportun-
ism and confusion with only modest enforcement costs, but such rules
may also frequently entail high compliance costs that straitjacket own-
ers and restrict an entity's practical applications. Consequently, mod-
ern legal systems often employ standards - such as the doctrines of
veil-piercing, equitable subordination, and fraudulent conveyance -
rather than rules to distinguish proper and improper asset movements
across entity boundaries. But while these doctrines promote flexibility,
they also invite uncertainty of litigation outcomes and require sophisti-
cated courts capable of assessing which asset movements subvert the
reliability of entities as devices for bonding contracts. It follows that
entity shielding inevitably imposes costs, either in the form of ex ante
rigidities or ex post judicial errors.
3. A Sophisticated Bankruptcy System. - Enforcement of entity
shielding, and of weak entity shielding in particular, generally requires
the creation of a sophisticated bankruptcy system. The typical alter-
native to a bankruptcy system is a first-to-file (or "first come, first
served") system, which permits creditors to seize a debtor's assets
based on the order in which those creditors file suit to enforce favor-
able judgments. Such prioritization is incompatible with weak entity
shielding, which distinguishes creditors based on whether they trans-
acted with a firm or its owners rather than on when they assert their
claims.
With weak entity shielding, a personal creditor's right to enforce a
claim on firm assets is contingent on whether sufficient firm assets will
remain to pay firm creditors in full. To determine, then, whether a
personal creditor should be permitted to seize firm assets, a court must
accurately assess the ratio between firm assets and debts. Typically,
this will require the court to exercise the broad powers associated with
a bankruptcy system: the powers to stay division of firm assets and de-
termine their aggregate value, simultaneously evaluate the validity and
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worth of the claims of multiple creditors, and oversee ongoing firm op-
erations during the pendency of proceedings.
Paradoxically, strong entity shielding is less dependent on the pres-
ence of a well-developed system of bankruptcy law and administration
than is weak entity shielding. Because the personal creditors of an
owner of a firm with strong entity shielding do not enjoy a unilateral
right to levy on firm assets, the insolvency of the owner need not pre-
cipitate an assessment of firm assets and liabilities to determine the
amount that personal creditors should be paid. Personal creditors in
that case are usually treated as merely stepping into the shoes of the
insolvent owner, receiving a net distribution of firm assets only after a
majority of owners agree to liquidate.44 Thus, at least from the stand-
point of administering a bankruptcy system, strong entity shielding
may entail lower costs than weak entity shielding does.
4. De-diversification of Creditor Claims. - Another cost of entity
shielding, which arises in both its strong and weak forms, is reduced
diversification of assets that back the claims of creditors. Let us return
to our hypothetical Florentine merchant. To keep things simple, as-
sume that the merchant is the only substantial investor in each of the
three partnerships and has no meaningful wealth outside of them. If
the three firms lack entity shielding, then a creditor of one is effec-
tively a creditor of all, since the assets of all three are equally available
as security for the debt. The amount the creditor can recover will thus
depend on the total returns to the three firms in combination. If, how-
ever, the three firms are separate entities with either weak or strong
entity shielding, then the creditor's recovery will depend mostly on the
performance of the particular firm to which he extended credit.
Unless the performance of the three separate firms is perfectly corre-
lated, the effect will be to increase the variance of the creditor's
returns.
A creditor could, of course, achieve diversification even in the pres-
ence of entity shielding by extending credit to multiple firms. Thus,
the relevant cost of entity shielding is not de-diversification per se, but
rather the added transaction costs necessary to achieve an efficient
level of diversification.
5. Illiquid Investments. - The costs we have discussed to this
point relate to entity shielding generally and to weak entity shielding
in particular. The remaining two costs we survey, by contrast, arise
only from strong entity shielding. The first such cost is investment il-
liquidity. An owner of a strong entity cannot unilaterally withdraw his
share of firm assets for purposes of personal consumption or to pursue
44 Moreover, if limited liability is added to strong entity shielding, insolvent firms need not
assess owners' assets and liabilities, reducing even further the complications of insolvency.
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higher investment returns elsewhere. This problem is particularly
acute for minority owners who lack control over distribution decisions.
For this reason, there is significant complementarity between strong
entity shielding and tradable shares, as tradability provides owners
with an alternative source of liquidity. Yet while tradable shares re-
duce the illiquidity costs of strong entity shielding, they usually require
costly institutions to implement, such as stock markets, regulatory sys-
tems to protect investors, disclosure requirements for public compa-
nies, and so on.
6. Exploitation by Control Persons. - The second cost specific to
strong entity shielding is exploitation by control persons. An owner's
right to withdraw at will serves as an important investor-protection
device: by threatening to withdraw assets and thus destroy going-
concern value, an owner lacking a controlling share of firm equity can
limit his exposure to expropriation by controlling owners. Strong en-
tity shielding deprives noncontrolling owners of this protection. All
else equal, strong entities are therefore likely to face greater difficulty
than other entity types in attracting noncontrolling investors. 45
C. Cost-Benefit Tradeoffs and Lessons from History
As our survey of economic costs and benefits suggests, entity
shielding is a story of tradeoffs: weak entity shielding reduces creditor
information costs but requires a bankruptcy system capable of preserv-
ing the prior claims of firm creditors to firm assets, the administrative
costs of which are in turn mitigated by entity shielding; tradable shares
are both a cost and a benefit of strong entity shielding; and all forms of
entity shielding entail enforcement costs that reduce opportunism
costs. While interesting in the abstract, this inventory of costs and
benefits tells us little about the development of specific legal forms. To
test its value, we must turn to history. In the following sections, we
trace a path through four societies that were on the cutting edge of
commercial development in their respective eras: ancient Rome, me-
dieval Italy, early modern England, and the contemporary United
States.
Our principal object in these historical vignettes is to explore the
extent to which economic considerations can explain the organizational
forms that provided entity shielding, and to a lesser extent owner
shielding, within each historical period. We do not deal here with a
single historical progression, since ancient Rome is discontinuous with
Western legal and economic development from the Middle Ages for-
45 For a model illustrating the choice between the partnership and the corporate form as a
simple tradeoff between exploitation by control persons and the benefits of protecting going-
concern value, see Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 16-18.
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ward. Nor do we attempt a comprehensive explanation of the level of
entity shielding in any given period. As our historical narratives illus-
trate, many factors influence the level of entity shielding displayed by
firms within a period, including the availability of alternative struc-
tures for financing businesses (such as wealthy families), the preva-
lence of capital-intensive enterprise, bankruptcy law, capital markets,
and even deep-seated cultural norms such as aristocratic attitudes to-
ward commerce. Economic historians conventionally argue that lim-
ited liability arose as a response to the financing needs of capital-
intensive technologies, but our examination of entity shielding suggests
that the factors shaping organizational law are actually much more
complex and varied.
We leave to others the difficult task of assessing the relative contri-
butions of these factors over time. Our focus here is twofold. First,
we identify the factors that seem to promote entity shielding. Second,
we explore how far economic considerations can go in making sense of
the forms of entities and entity shielding that arise within a particular
society.
Each society we analyze raises unique questions. In ancient Rome,
the challenge is to explain two specialized forms of strong asset parti-
tioning that appear in the law despite a general paucity of commercial
legal entities. One such form was a species of limited liability that
protected the Roman family but that may have remained unattached
- anomalously from a modern perspective - to a parallel rule of en-
tity shielding. The other was a strong entity form (the societas publi-
canorum) that Roman law made available only to commercial enter-
prises transacting with the state or other public entities, but not to
commercial enterprises in general. By contrast, in the intensely com-
mercial culture of medieval Italy we consider the particular form in
which entity shielding first became prevalent in Western commerce, as
well as the rise of specialized strong entities that are distant precursors
of the modern business corporation. In early modern England, we
trace the continued (if erratic) evolution of chartered and unchartered
joint stock companies into the modern business corporation, and we
examine the factors that encouraged the enfolding of weak entity
shielding into the modern partnership form. Finally, in contemporary
America we address the proliferation of strong entities, the crowding
out of weak entities, and the accelerated demise of nearly all restric-
tions on the deployment of entity and owner shielding.
We believe that each of these societies demonstrates the importance
of the institutions and practices that reduce the costs of entity shield-
ing, at least within the frame of the period in question. At the same
time, we do not wish to be understood as proposing a monocausal ac-
count of entity shielding. At most, economic cost-benefit considera-
tions become wholly decisive only in explaining the explosive spread of
asset partitioning in the legal and commercial practices of contempo-
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rary America. As we argue below, however, even here the law may
not yet have reached equilibrium, because it has not yet fully accom-
modated the more subtle costs that entity shielding can impose on
creditors whose claims it impairs.
IV. ANCIENT ROME
Across its millennium of history, ancient Rome saw the rise of both
sophisticated legal institutions and a vibrant economy. With the ap-
parent exception of a class of large firms providing services to the Ro-
man state, however, Roman commercial firms appear not to have been
endowed with entity shielding.
A. The Partnership (Societas)
The simplest ancient Roman commercial form was the societas, a
term often translated as "partnership" because it referred to an agree-
ment among Roman citizens to share an enterprise's profits and
losses.46 Beyond joint enterprise, however, the societas had little in
common with the modern partnership form. For one thing, the socie-
tas lacked mutual agency; each partner had to endorse a contract to be
bound by it. 4 1 Partners also did not stand behind one another's obli-
gations: the default rule of liability when they cosigned a debt was pro
rata rather than joint and several. 48 More generally, Roman law made
no distinction between the obligations and assets of the societas and
those of its members, 49 precluding the rules of weak asset partitioning
that characterize the modern partnership. All the more did the socie-
tas lack strong entity shielding: although partners could agree not to
withdraw firm assets before the expiration of a term,5 0 Roman law en-
forced such contracts through damages rather than specific perform-
ance,5 1 making a partner just one among many potential creditors
grappling for his copartner's assets when that copartner fell insolvent.
Consistent with their lack of entity shielding, most commercial so-
cietates had no more than a few members.5 2
46 W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN
504-07 (192 1).
47 As Roman law developed, members of a societas eventually could act for each other, al-
though for most of Roman history this innovation applied only to large banking partnerships, and
may not have applied to the regular societas until the sixth century A.D. under the Eastern (Byz-
antine) Emperor Justinian. Id. at 507, 5I0; JOHN CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 233 (967).
48 BUCKLAND, supra note 46, at 507.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 5o5.
S A partner could be held liable if he renounced fraudulently or at an especially inopportune
time for the firm. Id. at 5o8.
52 CROOK, supra note 47, at 229.
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The undeveloped status of the Roman partnership - which, as we
will see, contrasts starkly with the more robust form that the partner-
ship assumed beginning in the Middle Ages - seems attributable at
least in part to Rome's reliance on other forms of organization for most
business activity. Chief among these alternatives were the family and
the peculium.
B. The Family
Like the modern family, the Roman familia was a complete entity
in our parlance: only creditors who transacted with persons dealing on
behalf of the family had a claim to family assets. The Roman family
was, however, much broader than today's simple nuclear family, com-
prising the oldest living male in the male line of descent (the paterfa-
milias), his children, and his slaves, as well as all of his adult male de-
scendants and their own household members. The paterfamilias for-
mally owned all family property, whether acquired by him or by other
family members.
53
These attributes made the Roman family both large and, from a
creditor's view, robust. The family had an indefinitely long lifespan,
remaining intact over multiple generations. Moreover, those persons
to whom a family member evading creditors would be most inclined to
pass his assets - close relatives, and especially descendants - were
themselves part of the same entity and thus also liable for the same
debts.
The wealth of a single, prosperous Roman family was apparently
sufficient to finance the typical commercial firm, thus reducing the
need for multi-owner enterprise forms such as the partnership.
54 The
vast majority of Roman commercial firms operated on a small scale.
Most industrial production, such as that of ceramic lamps, ironware,
lead pipes, jewelry, and clothing, occurred in small workshops or in the
homes of craftsmen. 55 To be sure, large-scale production was not un-
known in Roman times: industries such as brick making, bronze smelt-
ing, glass blowing, and copperware manufacturing were characterized
53 Under the most common form of marriage, however, the wife's assets, including those she
brought into the marriage and those subsequently acquired, were not merged with those 
of the
pater familias except for the dowry; technically, they still belonged to her father's family. See
BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. McGINN, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW 12 1-38
(2004); AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SONS, SLAVES AND FREEDMEN IN ROMAN COMMERCE 12
(1987).
54 CROOK, supra note 47, at 229; see also TENNEY FRANK, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ROME 222 (1927). Wealth seems to have been concentrated in particular in families that owned
large plantations. JEAN-JACQUES AUBERT, BUSINESS MANAGERS IN ANCIENT ROME: A
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITORES, 2o B.C.-A.D. 25o, at 301 (1994).
55 See FRANK, supra note 54, at 220, 234-35, 240-44, 261-64; see also AUBERT, supra note 54,
at 298-99.
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by extensive factory production.56 Yet the large industries that oper-
ated in urban factories appear to have derived their scale economies
from labor specialization rather than capital intensiveness.5s For this
reason, most of the large-scale workshops in the more capital-intensive
metalworking and brickmaking industries were located on the estates
of landowning families that had made fortunes in agriculture and then
diversified.58
The ability of a single family to finance and manage one or more
commercial pursuits, moreover, was substantially extended by the in-
stitution of the peculium.
C. The Peculium
Slaveholding was extensive in ancient Rome, and it was to their
slaves that Roman families frequently delegated the responsibility for
managing commercial activity. This arrangement was congenial to
Roman social mores, under which trade was considered demeaning.
Moreover, Rome's slaves often exhibited commercial talent, in part be-
cause they frequently were captured in colonial wars with societies
such as Greece in which commercial activity was less discreditable.
It was common practice for a master to provide his slave (or some-
times his own son5 9 ) with a set of assets, termed a peculium, for use in
a business venture. 60 The peculium, plus any profits it generated, for-
mally remained the property of the master. The master benefited from
the arrangement either by receiving regular payments from the slave,
or by offering manumission as a reward for efforts by the slave that
grew the peculium's assets.6 1
Unlike the societas, the peculium business exhibited a degree of as-
set partitioning. Although default on peculium debt enabled creditors
of the peculium enterprise to sue the slave's master, the master's liabil-
ity was capped at the value of the peculium (plus any distributions he
had received from it) so long as he had not participated in its man-
agement. 62 Despite this provision for limited liability, the typical pecu-
Hum business (like the societas) appears not to have provided entity
shielding. That is, the personal creditors of a slaveholder may have
enjoyed a claim to all his assets, including those committed to peculia,
56 FRANK, supra note 54, at 223, 226-28, 236-38. In particular, certain potteries that special-
ized in tableware exported their products throughout the Mediterranean. JULES TOUTAIN, THE
ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 302-03 (930).
57 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 54, at 227.
58 See TOUTAIN, supra note 56, at 301.
59 KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 53, at 37.
60 Id. at 33.
61 See id. at 34-35.
62 CROOK, supra note 47, at 187-89; FELICIANO SERRAO, IMPRESA E RESPONSABILITA A
ROMA NELL'ETA COMMERCIALE 6 1-64 (2002).
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equal in priority to the claims of the peculium creditors. The available
sources are unclear on the issue. 63 We only know for sure that in the
peculium castrense - a special type of peculium consisting of sums
earned or otherwise acquired by a son from military service - credi-
tors of the peculium evidently did enjoy a prior claim on peculium as-
sets, 64 and thus the peculium castrense provided weak entity shielding.
But this explicit recognition of priority in the peculium castrense sug-
gests that the background rule for peculium creditors in general was
the contrary. If that inference is correct,65 slave-managed peculium
businesses, which were a mainstay of Roman commerce, used a highly
anomalous form of asset partitioning: complete owner shielding (lim-
ited liability) but no entity shielding at all. This is a pattern we will
not see again in our historical survey, and one that has not to our
knowledge appeared in any other significant class of commercial or-
ganizations in the past or present. The pattern is unusual because, in
general, entity shielding lays a necessary foundation for owner shield-
ing by providing firm creditors with an affirmative claim on firm as-
sets to offset the impairment of their claim to the firm owners' per-
sonal assets.
Absence of entity shielding in Roman peculium businesses may
nonetheless have made sense in the Roman context, reinforcing the in-
ference that this may well have been the rule. The fact that the typical
peculium business had a single owner (the slaveholder) would have in-
creased the hazard of opportunism toward creditors because a single
owner need not coordinate with others the transfer of assets into and
out of the entity. If the peculium had provided entity shielding, a pater
familias facing bankruptcy would have been tempted to assign per-
sonal assets to peculia and to encourage his slaves (or sons) to borrow
further against those assets and invest in speculative ventures. Success
in such ventures would have redounded to the ultimate benefit of the
paterfamilias, while the cost of failure would have fallen on his per-
sonal creditors. 66 The peculium castrense would have been less subject
63 See ANDREA DI PORTO, IMPRESA COLLETTIVA E SCHIAVO "MANAGER" IN ROMA
ANTICA 52 n.41 (1984).
64 See 3 SIRO SOLAZZI, IL CONCORSO DEI CREDITORI NEL DIRITTO ROMANO 200-03
(940). We are particularly indebted to Bruce Frier for help in researching this issue.
65 Both di Porto and Solazzi speculate that peculium creditors had priority of claim in ordi-
nary peculia as well as in the peculium castrense, evidently because they feel that result would be
logical. See DI PORTO, supra note 63, at 52-53; SOLAZZI, supra note 64, at 20o-03. But they do
not confront the contrary logic we offer here.
66 Roman law did provide creditors with a remedy for fraudulent conveyances, though how
effective that remedy was in contexts such as the peculium is unclear. See SERRAO, supra note
62, at 26; Joshua Getzler & Mike Macnair, The Firm as an Entity Before the Companies Acts,
available at http://www.law.cam.ac.ukdocs/view.php?doc=23
65, in ADVENTURES OF THE LAW:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE, DUBLIN
2003, at 267, 272 (Paul Brand et al. eds., 2005).
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to such opportunism because it was principally comprised of the son's
own earnings.
In addition, the single-owner nature of a peculium business would
have limited the benefits that entity shielding could have offered in re-
ducing creditor monitoring costs. As we note above, the absence of en-
tity shielding in a multi-owner firm requires a prospective firm credi-
tor to evaluate the personal creditworthiness of each firm owner. A
prospective creditor of a slave's peculium business, however, needed to
evaluate only the creditworthiness of the slaveholder to establish ap-
propriate terms of credit.
Finally, the limited liability that peculium businesses exhibited
would have provided them with de facto strong entity shielding
against one another's creditors. Limited liability in one peculium
business would have prevented the creditors of that business from
levying upon assets committed to other peculia of the same slave-
holder, effectively creating a privileged claim for those other peculia
creditors in the assets of the particular peculium business with which
they transacted. Such de facto entity shielding would have been only
partial, since it would not have excluded creditors of businesses in
which the master played an active managerial role. However, given
that Romans conducted a large fraction of their business via peculium
arrangements, the degree of de facto entity shielding may have been
substantial.
The availability of slave-managed peculium firms with a degree of
de facto entity shielding may also have made it less important to pro-
vide a rule of entity shielding to the societas. This is an issue to which
we return below.
D. The Tradable Limited Partnership (Societas Publicanorum)
An apparent exception to the general lack of entity shielding in
Roman commerce was a type of multi-owner firm known as the socie-
tas publicanorum. Dating from the third century B.C., the societates
publicanorum consisted of groups of investors, known as publicani,
who bid on state contracts for projects such as the construction of pub-
lic works, provision of armaments, and collection of taxes. 67 The state
paid a portion of the contract price upon accepting a bid, and the rest
when the contract was completed. The lead investor in the group
pledged his landed estates as security for performance of the con-
67 See E. BADIAN, PUBLICANS AND SINNERS: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN THE SERVICE OF
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 68-69 (1983). Although the societates publicanorum were numerous, it
seems that the actual contract of association for only one such firm has been found. See id. at 68;
see also ALBERTO VIGHI, LA PERSONALITA GIURIDICA DELLE SOCIETA COMMERCIALI
38-46 (19oo).
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tract.68 Other investors could act either as general partners, who exer-
cised control and were fully liable on firm debts, or as limited partners,
who lacked control but enjoyed limited liability.69 By the first century
B.C., the largest societates publicanorum appear to have resembled the
modern public company in both size and structure, with "multitudes"
- presumably hundreds - of limited partners who could trade their
shares on a market similar to a modern stock exchange.
70 Although
we lack direct evidence, the tradability of their shares strongly suggests
that the societates publicanorum enjoyed strong entity shielding at
least with respect to their limited partners. As we emphasize above,
tradability of shares is difficult to sustain without strong entity shield-
ing, while tradability in turn provides the liquidity that strong entity
shielding would otherwise deny to the firm's shareholders.
71
In addition to creating liquidity problems, the liquidation protec-
tion that characterizes strong entity shielding increases the risk of op-
portunism by those in control. Modern societies deal with this prob-
lem through elaborate public and private mechanisms of investor
protection. There is no evidence that ancient Rome developed such
mechanisms. How, then, were the costs of control person opportunism
kept within bounds? One answer may lie in the fact that the so-
cietates publicanorum evidently provided services only to the state and
not to private parties. As a firm's only customer, the state would have
had a strong interest in ensuring that the firm was managed efficiently
and honestly, and would also have been in a good position to notice se-
rious malfeasance and take action against it.
68 ULRIKE MALMENDIER, SOCIETAS PUBLICANORUM: STAATLICHE WIRTCHAFTSAK-
TIVITATEN IN DEN HANDEN PRIVATER UNTERNEHMER 273-74 (2002). A short description
of the societates publicanorum is also provided in Ulrike Malmendier, Roman Shares, in THE
ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL
MARKETS 31 (William N. Goetzmann & K. Geert Rouwenhorst eds., 2005).
69 MALMENDIER, supra note 68, at 261-68.
70 Id. at 249-5.
71 Further evidence of strong entity shielding in the societates publicanorum is that, unlike a
simple societas, a societas publicanorum survived the death of any of its members except that of
the lead investor whose name appeared on the contract with the state. When a member other
than the lead investor died, his heir stepped into his financial rights and obligations, although the
heir became a full firm member only if there had been a prior agreement to that effect. Id. at
243-47; see also CROOK, supra note 47, at 234 (discussing such limitations on the rights of heirs in
the context of societates publicanorum formed for tax farming); P.W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 16o (I97I) (same). Still further evidence for strong entity shielding is that
the societas publicanorum appears to have been able to receive a type of legal personality that
permitted a firm to own property and transact in its own name, although this privilege may have
been used only by the larger firms. See BADIAN, supra note 67, at 69. Ulrike Malmendier argues
that the societas publicanorum enjoyed full legal entity status by the first century B.C., although
she does not specifically address the question of entity shielding. See MALMENDIER, supra note
68, at 252-55.
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E. Some Open Questions
We have seen that there is substantial logic to the forms of assetpartitioning exhibited by each of ancient Rome's best developed enter-prise forms: the family, the peculium, and the societas publicanorum.
Taken as a whole, however, the patterns of commercial organization in
ancient Rome present a striking contrast. For business done in theprivate sector, Rome apparently had no forms of enterprise organiza-
tion that provided weak or strong entity shielding. But for businessdone with the state, Romans developed and made extensive use of an
organizational form that enjoyed strong entity shielding and bore a
substantial resemblance to a modern publicly traded corporation. 2
This pattern of institutional development presents at least two sig-
nificant questions. First, why did Roman law not grant weak entity
shielding to the societas, thus offering a general-purpose commercial
entity for private commerce? Second, why was the societas publica-
norum not employed for business with the private sector as it was with
the public sector?
As for the first question, we explain above that even weak entity
shielding may have been inefficient for peculium businesses, largely
because of their single-owner nature. But the same reason does not ex-
tend to the societas. And although the broadly conceived Roman fam-
ily, supplemented with slave-managed peculium businesses, may have
been an adequate vehicle for much of Roman commerce, it is hard toimagine that developing the societas into a general partnership form
with weak entity shielding would not have been advantageous. The
costs seemingly would have been modest. If Roman courts were capa-
ble of sorting out creditors and assets based on the distinction between
a slave's peculium and the other affairs of the slave's master, as was
required by the limited liability that came with the peculium, then pre-
sumably they could have done the same with the creditors and assets
of a partnership and those of its various partners.
We may have to look to noncommercial aspects of Roman culture
to find an answer. Perhaps Roman society was unwilling to risk the
stability and status of prominent families for the sake of commerce.
Hence Roman law placed all power over a family's wealth in the paterfamilias, and then made it difficult for the pater familias to delegate
the power to put that wealth at risk. For instance, Roman law fa-
mously had no general concept of agency. The persons to whom
72 More accurately, the Roman societates publicanorum closely resemble the publicly traded
limited partnerships that played a strong role in the economy of nineteenth-century France. SeeNaomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Business's Organizational
Choice: A Comparison of France and the United States During the Mid-Nineteenth Century 7-10(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10288, 2004), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w o288.
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agency authority could be given - such as sons, slaves, and the man-
agers of a societas publicanorum - had power to commit only the
specific assets placed in their possession. The lack of mutual agency
among partners is consistent with this more general pattern. Perhaps
the same conservatism about committing family wealth that seems to
have been reflected in ancient Rome's limits on agency authority dis-
couraged a grant of priority to business creditors over other family
creditors with respect to any family assets. For the Romans, the risks
of commercial credit may have been more salient than its advantages,
and hence they were not eager to facilitate it.
In any event, one thing is clear. It was not for lack of imagination
that the Romans failed to develop general-purpose commercial entities.
The Romans clearly understood the concept of entity shielding in both
its weak and strong forms. As we note above, they employed weak en-
tity shielding in the peculium castrense.7 3 And they evidently em-
ployed strong entity shielding in the societas publicanorum. Moreover,
well before the Republic ended in the first century B.C., Roman law
had come to recognize noncommercial legal entities such as munici-
palities and nonprofit organizations.
7 4
This leads us to our second question: why was the societas publi-
canorum not used for private business? Perhaps the ratio of benefits
to costs was too low. Unlike the state, few private parties may have
needed services that only heavily capitalized firms could provide.
Moreover, as we suggest above, creating publicly traded firms not con-
73 Rome also had a law of secured transactions sophisticated enough to handle floating liens
on commercial assets. R.W. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 19o-96 (1937). Because it generally
bonds only named creditors, and not a shifting group of creditors, a security interest is a much
more restrictive device than a legal entity. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note i, at 418. But
floating liens certainly signify a system of commercial law with a sophisticated approach to credi-
tors' rights. (At the same time, we note that the availability of floating liens might have reduced
somewhat the demand for weak entities, for which they can serve as something of a substitute.)
74 Aside from the family, Roman law recognized three types of noncommercial organizations
as distinct - and, in our terms, complete - legal entities. The first, the collegium, was employed
originally for fraternal associations. See DUFF, supra note 71, at 152 ("[I]t is almost certain that
the property of a corporate college was protected against the creditors of individual mem-
bers .... ); see also id. at 95-158; accord ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF
ROMAN LAW 395 (1953). The second distinct Roman legal entity was the municipal corporation
(or municipium). See DUFF, supra note 71, at 62. Finally, Rome recognized a noncommercial
type of entity that covered a mixed class of membership and charitable organizations. See id. at
177 (grouping these organizations together as "charitable foundations"). Like the family, all three
of these were complete entities: neither members nor their creditors enjoyed a claim to entity as-
sets. Unlike the family, however, these entities were controlled by persons who held personal
property outside the entity, thus creating a hazard of asset distributions to the detriment of entity
creditors. Distributions of net assets to controlling persons were formally barred, however, by
virtue of the "nondistribution constraint" that remains today the defining characteristic of a non-
profit organization. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 838-40 (I98O). The entities thus featured resilient organizational boundaries that contributed
to their conspicuous success as asset-pooling devices.
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fined to public contracting may have required costly institutions for
protecting investors. Part of the answer may also lie in political con-
siderations. When Rome transformed itself from a republic into an
empire in the first century B.C., the wealth and influence of the publi-
cani drew jealous attention from the emperors,7 5 who ordered the state
to take over much of the construction of public works. The publicani
persisted for a time as tax collectors, but repeated clampdowns elimi-
nated them from even this role by the end of the second century A.D.76
V. MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE ITALY
Europe's economy in the centuries after the fall of Rome provided
little impetus for the formation of commercial firms with multiple
owners. Southern Europe's population was reduced by a series of epi-
demics in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., and then held in check by
a decline in agricultural productivity caused by soil exhaustion and,
possibly, climate change.77 Among the consequences was a severe de-
crease in investment in commercial ventures. 8
Agricultural yields and thus population levels finally began a slow
rally at the end of the tenth century A.D., in turn stimulating a revival
of trade.7 9 Because the decay of the great Roman roads had pushed
most of the remaining long-distance commerce into the Mediterranean,
by the time of trade revitalization the political center of gravity had
shifted outward to Italian ports such as Amalfi, Pisa, Genoa, and Ven-
ice.80 Unlike in ancient Rome, mercantile families comprised much of
the ruling class in these new city-states, as they would later in the
inland cities, such as Florence and Siena, whose own prosperity began
in the thirteenth century. The result was a cluster of legal regimes
highly responsive to the needs of commerce. 8' The renewed impor-
tance of long-distance trade, combined with merchants' influence over
lawmaking, gave rise to the law merchant - a set of commercial rules
that exhibited substantial homogeneity across jurisdictions.82
75 During the first century B.C., the publicani formed a cartel to demand remission of fees
paid on unprofitable tax farming contracts. Julius Caesar promised to heed their demands if he
won the Roman Civil War, and he thereby gained their support. FRANK, supra note 54, at 182.
76 CROOK, supra note 47, at 234.
77 Robert S. Lopez, The Trade of Medieval Europe: The South, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 257, 306 (M. Postan & E.E. Rich eds., 1952).
78 ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES: 950-
1350, at i8 (1976).
79 See id. at 27-34.
80 Lopez, supra note 77, at 3 16-17.
81 See FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA 38-57 (2001); SANTARELLI, supra note
34, at 41-53; VIGHI, supra note 67, at 60-63.
82 The extent of their homogeneity is subject to debate. See J.H. Baker, The Law Merchant
and the Common Law Before r7oo, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295 (i979); Stephen E. Sachs, From St.
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The most important forms of medieval trade were supported by ex-
tensive debt financing, commonly in the form of short- and long-term
credit from customers and suppliers. Many of the law merchant's in-
novations were thus designed to make merchants more creditworthy.
In particular, commercial law was heavily pro-creditor, dealing harshly
with merchants who failed to pay their debts. Litigation involving
merchants commonly took place in special merchant courts in which
process was rapid, with disputes often decided in a matter of days.
8 3
A. Households and Partnerships
As in ancient Rome, the family - or, more accurately, the house-
hold - was the basic legal entity. There were, however, significant
differences between ancient Roman and medieval Italian households.
First, sons, like their fathers, had the general capacity to commit fam-
ily assets.8 4 Second, while adult sons sharing the father's household or
participating in the family business were presumed part of the family
entity, sons who did neither could be considered outside the family en-
tity.85  Both changes made the medieval Italian family more like a
modern commercial partnership than its Roman antecedent, and re-
flected the fact that productive enterprise and trade were commonly
conducted at the level of the household.
The medieval Italian partnership, the compagnia, evolved gradually
out of the laws and customs governing the household, as merchants
grew their businesses by adding persons unrelated to the household.
8 6
At first the compagnia differed from the Roman societas only in its use
of joint and several - rather than pro rata - liability among partners
for firm debt.87 Over time, however, the compagnia also acquired mu-
tual agency, 8 a development that would have made it more useful to
Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval "Law Merchant", 21 AM. UNIV.
INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2o06).
83 ALESSANDRO LATTES, IL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE NELLA LEGISLAZIONE STATU-
TARIA DELLE CITTA ITALIANE 259, 298 (Milan, Hoepli 1884).
84 See MAX WEBER, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE
AGES 86 (Lutz Kaelber trans., Rowman & Littlefield 2003) (1889).
85 See id. at lO9-1o; see also SANTARELLI, supra note 34, at 129.
86 See SANTARELLI, supra note 34, at 130-31; WEBER, supra note 84, at io6-o8.
87 LOPEZ, supra note 78, at 74; 2 ARMANDO SAPORI, Le Compagnie Mercantili Toscane del
Dugento e dei Primi del Trecento: La Responsabilitd dei Compagni verso i Terzi, in STUDI DI
STORIA ECONOMICA 765, 765-66 (3 d ed. 1955); 2 ARMANDO SAPORI, Storia Interna della
Compagnia Mercantile dei Peruzzi, in STUDI DI STORIA ECONOMICA, supra, at 653, 664.
88 See W. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT
132-33 (1904); RAYMOND DE ROOVER, MONEY, BANKING AND CREDIT IN MEDIEVAL
BRUGES 32 (1999).
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larger firms, and which in fact coincided with the increased scale of
commerce that came with the High Middle Ages. 9
B. Entity Shielding and Bankruptcy
Most importantly for our purposes, the medieval law merchant was
innovative with respect to entity shielding. Although the rule evi-
dently developed gradually 90 and to different degrees in different
places, medieval Italy eventually arrived at a regime whereby partner-
ship creditors enjoyed a claim to partnership assets that was prior to
the claim of the partners' personal creditors. 91 This rule of weak en-
tity shielding for partnerships was not matched by a symmetric rule of
weak owner shielding: personal creditors not only lacked priority of
claim on a merchant's personal assets,92 but their claims were also
generally disadvantaged with respect to those of business creditors, re-
flecting the broad disposition toward facilitating trade credit.
The evolution of weak entity shielding in the Italian compagnia re-
flected not only the increasing salience of the rule's reduction of the
costs of credit, but also the development of a system of bankruptcy
law. As indicated in Part III, a bankruptcy regime both makes possi-
ble and benefits from a rule of weak entity shielding. Consistent with
this observation, procedures for handling merchant bankruptcies had
begun to develop in the Italian city-states by the early thirteenth cen-
tury.93 The basic rule was pro rata division of assets among creditors
89 While the typical cornpagnia was a small firm with a fixed term of generally less than five
years, JEAN FAVIER, GOLD & SPICES: THE RISE OF COMMERCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 157
(1998), increases in the scale of commerce by the last half of the thirteenth century led to compag-
nie with as many as twenty (often unrelated) partners and several hundred employees. EDWIN S.
HUNT & JAMES M. MURRAY, A HISTORY OF BUSINESS IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 1200-1550, at
62 (1999). For example, in i312 only eight of the seventeen partners of the large Florentine Pe-
ruzzi compagnia were members of the Peruzzi family, and by 1331 the family had only a minority
interest in the firm. See RAYMOND DE ROOVER, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MEDICI
BANK 1397-I494, at 77-78 (1963); see also HUNT & MURRAY, supra, at 1o5-o9; Raymond de
Roover, The Organization of Trade, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE
42, 76-79 (M.M. Postan et al. eds., 1965). Typically, the largest of these compagnie originated as
traders of grain or textiles in central Italy and grew by establishing new branches in foreign cities.
See HUNT & MURRAY, supra, at o2-o5; de Roover, supra, at 70-89. Once these partnerships
established a network of international branches, they were well placed to trade in international
currencies as well. Consequently, they soon also became Europe's dominant international bank-
ers. 3 ARMANDO SAPORI, Dalla "Compagnia" alla "Holding," in STUDI DI STORIA
ECONOMICA, supra note 87, at 87, 127, 132-33.
90 VIGHI, supra note 67, at 5o, 57-6o.
91 GALGANO, supra note 8i, at 45.
92 There were some forms of personal assets that were unavailable to a merchant's business
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, including his wife's dowry, family real estate, and some per-
sonal possessions. But these assets were evidently unavailable to personal creditors as well.
LATTES, supra note 83, at 339 & nn.i 1-12; SANTARELLI, supra note 35, at 242-43.
93 See SANTARELLI, supra note 35, at 33-39; Francesco Galgano, L'iniziativa del debitore nel
fallirnento delle societd personali, 5 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE 289, 304 & n.74 (0959) (It.).
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based on the relative value of their claims. This regime constituted a
deviation from the Roman rule of priority for earlier-arising debts - a
deviation presumably adopted because of the speed and simplicity it
offered in handling the claims of commercial creditors.
94
Only an individual merchant, not a compagnia, could be the formal
subject of bankruptcy.9 As the partnership developed, however, rules
evolved that in effect provided for firms to go bankrupt. If a member
of a partnership fell bankrupt in connection with a debt of the part-
nership, then all other partners of that firm would also be declared
bankrupt regardless of whether they were in fact insolvent. 96 The re-
sult was that all creditors of the partnership were able to seize a por-
tion of each partner's assets, including assets held by the partnership,
when a partnership failed to pay its debts. Moreover, the creditors
would first have to exhaust partnership assets before taking the part-
ners' personal assets. 97
In addition to bankruptcy proceedings, another likely contributor
to the rise of entity shielding in the Middle Ages was the medieval
revolution in bookkeeping methods. Recordkeeping became cheaper
with the introduction of inexpensive paper in Italy in the thirteenth
century, and arithmetic became easier with the displacement of Roman
numerals by Hindu-Arabic digits in the late fourteenth century. Dou-
ble-entry accounting, which provided the first workable method for
tracking a firm's net value, also appeared in the fourteenth century
and spread thereafter.98 These innovations made it easier for owners
and creditors to assess the value of firm assets and distinguish permis-
sible from impermissible distributions. This increase in the reliability
of financial reports made creditors more likely to accept a firm's busi-
ness assets, rather than the personal assets of its owners, as the princi-
pal bond for the firm's obligations.
Medieval weak entity shielding differed from the analogous modern
rule for partnerships in two important respects. First, it applied not
just to partnerships, but to businesses owned by individual merchants
as well. Formation of a sole proprietorship today, in contrast, does not
94 SANTARELLI, supra note 35, at 264.
95 See id. at 187; Galgano, supra note 93, at 300-o5, 310.
96 See SANTARELLI, supra note 35, at 187; Galgano, supra note 93, at 300-05, 310. If a mer-
chant was a partner in two different compagnie, A and B, and committed an act of bankruptcy in
connection with A, then the partners of B would not be thrown into bankruptcy, although B
would be subject to dissolution.
97 See VIGHI, supra note 67, at 134-35; Galgano, supra note 93, at 327 n.141.
98 ALFRED W. CROSBY, THE MEASURE OF REALITY: QUANTIFICATION AND WESTERN
SOCIETY, 125o-I6OO, at 206 (I997); RAYMOND DE ROOVER, The Commercial Revolution of the
Thirteenth Century, in ENTERPRISE AND SECULAR CHANGE 8o, 81 (Frederic C. Lane & Jelle
C. Riemersma eds., 1953). The spread of new commercial practices would have been aided sig-
nificantly by the development of movable type in the mid-fifteenth century.
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in itself bring entity shielding: there is no distinction between an
owner's personal assets and creditors and those of the owner's busi-
ness. Today an individual can obtain entity shielding for a wholly
owned business only by forming a business corporation or limited li-
ability company of which the owner is the sole shareholder. Moreover,
the single-shareholder corporation has been slow to win acceptance in
modern law.99
Why did medieval law, in contrast to modern law, endow sole pro-
prietorships with entity shielding? Several possible reasons come to
mind. To begin with, the lack of any form of owner shielding meant
that entity shielding had only benefits and no costs for business credi-
tors. Thus, it unequivocally increased a merchant's creditworthiness
while aggravating only slightly the burdens faced by personal credi-
tors, who already operated under strong limitations.100 Moreover,
given that the law considered other male members of a merchant's
household his partners, the contrary rule would have made creditors'
rights depend rather arbitrarily on whether a merchant currently had
other male family members in his household. Finally, guild rules,
which constrained closely the forms and methods of merchant activity,
made the nature of a merchant's business activities difficult to obfus-
cate and hence inhibited opportunistic use of entity shielding to avoid
personal - or other business - creditors.
The second difference between medieval and modern entity shield-
ing is that the medieval form was heavily locational in its operation. If
a merchant was engaged in businesses at different locations, or oper-
ated branches of the same business at different locations, creditors at
one location enjoyed priority of claim to the assets held there. 101 The
consequence was that each branch of a merchant's business was effec-
tively a distinct entity. This location-based entity shielding is in con-
trast to the contemporary rule of firm-based entity shielding, whereby
all creditors of a partnership enjoy equal priority to all the partnership
assets wherever they are located.
99 See, e.g., PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY
LAW 4-5 (7 th ed. 2003) (noting that U.K. law did not formally allow a one-person private com-
pany until 1989); CALLY JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE LAW IN ASIA,
EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH 62 (1997) (noting that although the
French closely held company form - the SARL - requires at least two shareholders, there is
now a "more generalized trend toward the acceptance of one-person corporations" among the
member states of the European Union).
100 So far as personal credit was concerned, medieval law, like Roman law generally, favored
debtors over creditors - for example, by forcing unpaid creditors to accept compromises and sub-
stantial extensions of time to pay. LATTES, supra note 83, at 310 (noting that, from a creditor's
viewpoint, insolvent nonmerchant debtors (debitori civili) were treated more indulgently than
commercial debtors).
101 GALGANO, supra note 81, at 63 n.36 (collecting sources).
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Location-based entity shielding was presumably an adaptation to
the highly fragmented nature of the political jurisdictions of the time
and the difficulties that this fragmentation created for the effective
administration of bankruptcy law. Because the geographic reach of
trade was far wider than the jurisdictional reach of the courts in the
small city-states of medieval Italy, merchants had a strong incentive to
flee to another jurisdiction in order to avoid their creditors - an in-
centive frequently acted upon. 10 2 In fact, "merchant in flight" was the
term generally used to refer to a bankrupt merchant. 10 3 The tempta-
tion to flee was heightened by the fact that the largest firms of the time
engaged primarily in trading and banking, and thus held non-fixed as-
sets - such as marketable goods, coin, and financial claims - that
were easy to make off with. Furthermore, the courts' limited jurisdic-
tion meant that a single court often could not reach, or even discover,
assets held in other jurisdictions. 104
In light of these jurisdictional limitations, there was probably little
to be gained by establishing a bankruptcy process that sought to as-
semble all of a firm's business assets wherever held, and all debts
wherever owed, and then divide the assets ratably among the credi-
tors. Not only would such an effort likely fail, but the time it required
would increase the opportunity for firm owners to abscond with assets.
More logical was a faster procedure whereby all of a bankrupt firm's
creditors with claims arising locally could immediately seek satisfac-
tion out of the firm's local assets.
10 5
While the resulting system of location-based asset partitioning
would have been relatively easy to administer, it came at the cost of
depriving merchants of the option of setting up a different system of
partitioning if they preferred. A creditor could be given a first priority
claim only to the assets of the local branch with which he dealt. The
102 LATTES, supra note 83, at 334 n.I6; ROBERT S. LOPEZ & IRVING W. RAYMOND,
MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD 290 (1978); see also SANTARELLI, su-
pra note 35, at 34-39.
103 SANTARELLI, supra note 35, at 48-60.
104 This is not to say that there was no means of reaching assets that a merchant held in an-
other jurisdiction. From the twelfth through the early fourteenth centuries, if a merchant from
one jurisdiction failed to pay a debt owed in another, the latter jurisdiction would often threaten
or undertake group reprisal by seizing the goods of, or barring from trade, all merchants from the
offending merchant's home city. The result, in effect, was to make all merchants from a given
city sureties for each other when in a foreign jurisdiction. See Avner Greif, Institutions and Im-
personal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility, I58 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 168, 188-89 (2002); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, & Barry R. Weingast, Coordination,
Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745, 753-58
(1994).
105 While we have little direct evidence, one suspects that the system was administered with
more speed than precision and that the division of assets among creditors was relatively crude.
See, e.g., LATTES, supra note 83, at 330.
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system did not permit the owners of a multi-city firm to give all of the
firm's creditors an equal priority claim to all of the firm's assets wher-
ever located.
There is some evidence that, at least in the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries, the entity shielding granted to partnerships by the
law was weaker than merchants would have wished. Members of a
medieval compagnia often promised in their partnership agreement to
refrain from joining other partnerships, 0 6 and under some early stat-
utes this commitment was imposed as a matter of law. 107 The com-
mitment may have been intended, at least in part, to prevent partners
from diverting firm opportunities to themselves. But it probably also
served, and was intended to serve, to insulate the firm from the spill-
over effect when another firm with an overlapping partner became in-
solvent. As such, this rule provided the kind of protection offered by
strong entity shielding, in that it protected not just firm creditors' pri-
ority of claim but also a firm's going-concern value.
A legal rule of strong entity shielding would have been superior to
such contractual commitments in two ways. First, it would have pro-
vided insulation from the spillover effect without barring merchants
from becoming members of more than one firm. Second, it would
have insulated firms more effectively because it would have been en-
forceable against non-firm creditors without their consent, whereas a
mere contract among partners presumably would not have bound the
creditors of outside firms that a partner had joined in violation of the
agreement. On the other hand, the simple promise not to invest in
other partnerships had the advantage, relative to strong entity shield-
ing, of not requiring partners to weaken their control over firm affairs
by giving up their personal withdrawal rights.
The organizational structure of the largest international Italian
firms in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries arguably reflects, at
least in part, an effort to reinforce the rule of locational entity shielding
that seems to have been achieving broader use at the time. Until the
mid-fourteenth century, each of the great international Italian firms
was organized as a single large partnership with branch offices located
throughout Europe. In the early 1340s, the largest of these firms -
then all headquartered in Florence - collapsed suddenly, evidently as
a consequence of macroeconomic factors. 0 8 When new international
106 Armando Sapori cites for this and other "standard" clauses in partnership agreements the
1310 contract of the Tolomei partnership. See 3 SAPORI, supra note 89, at 124-25; see also
FAVIER, supra note 89, at 164; LOPEZ & RAYMOND, supra note 1O2, at 198-99.
107 See, e.g., II Constituto del Comune di Siena dell'Anno 1262, II, 123; II, 82, cited in A.
Arcangeli, Gli istituti del diritto commerciale nel costituto senese del 1310, 4 RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 243, 348 (I9O6) (It.).
108 2 SAPORI, Storia Interna della Compagnia Mercantile dei Peruzzi, supra note 87, at 686-88.
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firms arose later in the fourteenth century, they were organized not as
single partnerships but rather on a hub-and-spoke system with branch
offices formed as separate partnerships, and with a central partnership
(or individual) that held a controlling interest in each subpartnership
and exercised company-wide executive authority. The Medici bank
was a prominent example of this new organizational structure.
10 9 This
organizational shift is commonly explained as an effort to avoid the
sudden systemic bankruptcies of the past by making each branch of a
firm to some degree independent of the others."10 This explanation is
not, however, entirely satisfying because it is not obvious that the new
arrangement was less vulnerable to company-wide collapse. Given
that each partnership within the structure lacked limited liability or
any other form of owner shielding, and that each partnership also
benefited from only weak entity shielding, unpaid creditors of any one
branch office would have been able to levy against assets held in the
other branches, leading to failure of all of the branches whenever the
assets of the whole company and its owners were inadequate to cover
the company's aggregate debts - which is the same condition under
which a single integrated partnership would fail.
An advantage that the hub-and-spoke system does seem to have of-
fered, however, was that creditors of each branch office had more con-
trol over the losses they might incur from such a domino-effect bank-
ruptcy. With each office organized as a separate partnership, the
creditors of each office would have had a clearer first claim to the as-
sets of that particular office, and hence less exposure to claims arising
from other branches. In short, the hub-and-spoke system may have
served as a formal reinforcement of the locational asset partitioning
that had become customary practice. It is difficult to assess just how
important this consideration might have been."1 There would have
been other reasons for adopting the new arrangement, such as provid-
109 See DE ROOVER, supra note 89, at 77-86.
110 See, e.g., id. at 77-78; 1 FEDERIGO MELIS, ASPETTI DELLA VITA ECONOMICA MEDIE-
VALE (STUDI NELL'ARCHIVIo DATINI DI PRATO) 130-3 1 (1962).
111 A 1495 lawsuit involving two Medici partnerships raises some doubt about the rigor with
which courts observed entity shielding between branches of a firm operating in different loca-
tions, even when the branches were organized as separate partnerships under the subpartnership
system. The lawsuit was brought against a firm in Naples that was ninety-five percent owned by
the Medici branch in Rome and five percent by its Neapolitan manager. The plaintiff was the
holder of a bill of exchange drawn in Rome and payable in Naples. The courts held that, for pur-
poses of the litigation, the two firms could be treated as one - and hence, apparently, it was not
important to decide which firm was directly liable for the debt. See DE ROOVER, supra note 89,
at 139-40, 26o-6I. With weak entity shielding, of course, this would not have been the case: if the
Rome partnership was the only firm directly liable for the debt, then the holder of the bill was
only a subordinated creditor of the Naples firm - an important difference, given that the Rome
partnership was evidently insolvent and the Naples subpartnership was also in financial diffi-
culty.
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ing stronger incentives to local managers (who were generally made
partners only in the local subpartnership) and insulating those local
managers from personal liability for debts that arose in other branches
of the company (a benefit that the subpartnership structure would
have provided even in the absence of weak entity shielding).'1 2
C. Limited Partnerships
Like their Roman forebears, medieval Italians developed a stronger
form of asset partitioning through firms organized, in effect, as limited
partnerships.
The earliest such form was the commenda, which arose during the
tenth and eleventh centuries as a device for financing maritime trade.
The prototypical commenda had two partners: a passive investor who
provided capital, and a traveling trader (often the ship captain) who
contributed labor and initiative.113 A commenda lasted only a single,
round-trip voyage, at the end of which the merchandise obtained in
foreign ports was sold and the profits divided between the active and
passive partners according to pre-specified proportions. 114
Scholarly interest in the commenda has derived primarily from the
fact that the passive partner usually enjoyed limited liability.15 Given
the passive partner's lack of control over firm matters, limited liability
made sense as a way of shielding him from imprudent borrowing by
the active partner. At the same time, the passive partner's lack of con-
trol disabled him from causing the firm to make opportunistic distribu-
tions to him at the expense of firm creditors. And the active (or gen-
eral) partner, personally liable for any shortfall in firm assets, would
have had no incentive to make distributions to the passive partner that
might compromise firm solvency. In all of these respects, the com-
menda reflected the tradeoffs among control, incentives, and liability
typical of limited partnerships in general. The reason that this trade-
off of limited liability for lack of control first appears in seagoing ven-
112 A case decided in Bruges in 1455 suggests the effectiveness of this strategy. In that case, a
Milanese merchant named Ruffini sued the Medici's Bruges branch for the defective packing of
wool bales that he had purchased from the Medici's London branch. The court rejected Ruffini's
argument that, since the Medici family controlled both firms, he should be able to recover from
one for the debts of the other. The court instead accepted the defendant's reasoning that the case
against the Bruges branch should be dismissed because, given that the two branches were distinct
partnerships, Ruffini was required to bring his action against the London branch with which he
had dealt. See id. at 83-84.
113 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 352-53 (1983); LOPEZ & RAYMOND, supra note 102, at 175; de Roover, su-
pra note 89, at 49-50.
114 LOPEZ, supra note 78, at 76-77; LOPEZ & RAYMOND, supra note 102, at 175; de Roover,
supra note 89, at 49-50.
115 See MURAT CIZAKCA, A COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS 14
(1996); see also WEBER, supra note 84, at 81.
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tures is presumably that the passive partner's renunciation of control
was made particularly credible by the fact that the firm's assets were
at sea or in foreign ports for the life of the venture.
While the partial limited liability of the commenda was important
historically, an equally significant feature of the arrangement was a
rule whereby the commenda had strong entity shielding with respect to
the passive partner. 116 This arrangement was likely acceptable to the
passive partner because in the commenda, unlike the typical com-
pagnia, the firm's assets were sequestered in the hull of the ship or in
foreign ports, so that anything the active partner wished to expropriate
would still have to come back with him. Once the ship arrived at its
home port, and windows of opportunism thereby opened to the active
partner, the contract dissolved and the passive partner was immedi-
ately owed his due. The hull of the ship thus acted as a resilient
boundary for the firm that reduced the costs of both limited liability
and liquidation protection, making the commenda particularly well
suited to realize the benefits of strong asset partitioning in the medie-
val period.
A version of the commenda was later developed for terrestrial use.
In its typical employment it resembled its maritime progenitor: a pas-
sive investor financed a traveling merchant on a trading expedition,
and the firm was dissolved upon the merchant's return.
117 Subse-
quently, by the fifteenth century there evolved a more general form of
nonmaritime limited partnership termed the societd in accomandita."
8
Passive partners in the accomandita enjoyed limited liability so long as
they refrained from lending their name to the firm and from partici-
pating in its management. 1 9 Like the commenda, the accomandita
was evidently used principally for short terms during which firm assets
were remote from the limited partners. The Medici bank, for example,
used the accomandita when creating new branches in foreign cities.
The local branch manager would serve as the general partner, and the
central Medici bank in Florence (a general partnership) served as the
limited partner. The motive was to limit exposure of Medici family
wealth to the conduct of the untried manager. If the local manager
proved his reliability within the prescribed period (typically two years),
116 WEBER, supra note 84, at 76-77. This rule may not have been universal. Like the com-
pagnia, the commenda also would have had weak entity shielding with respect to the active
partner.
117 See LOPEZ & RAYMOND, supra note 102, at 188-89.
118 The form was well developed at least by 14o8, when it was adopted by statute in Florence.
de Roover, supra note 89, at 75.
119 DE ROOVER, supra note 89, at 89, 284, 325.
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the firm was reformed as a general partnership (compagnia) in which
the Medici family accepted unlimited liability.120
Why was the use of limited partnerships confined to short-term ar-
rangements involving investments at a distance? One evident reason
was that - as the arrangements of the Medici bank indicate - lim-ited liability was generally unworkable for the trading and banking
firms of the time. The fluid and fungible nature of these firms' assets
made those assets a weak basis for firm credit, with the consequence
that personal liability was important for creditworthiness. Further
evidence of the need for personal liability can be found in an ill-fated
experiment by Siena - then the dominant center of European banking
- which in 13io adopted a statute providing that partners in compag-
nie bore only pro rata personal liability for firm debts rather than thejoint and several liability that had previously prevailed and continued
to prevail elsewhere. The result was that Sienese firms were so handi-
capped in attracting credit that, by the time joint and several liability
was reinstated in 1342, Florence had permanently displaced Siena as
the center of European banking.121 Clearly, if pro rata liability was aninsufficient basis for credit, full limited liability would have been even
less workable.
This is not to say that long-lived firms with the stronger forms of
asset partitioning were entirely absent from medieval and Renaissance
Europe. Their most conspicuous development took place later, how-
ever, and not in Italy but in England.
VI. EARLY MODERN ENGLAND
In contrast to the vibrant city-states that dotted the medieval Ital-ian peninsula, the English realm of the Middle Ages can be fairly
called an economic backwater.122 Native industry was inconsiderable,
and the nation's international trade, based almost entirely on export of
raw materials such as wool, was mostly in the hands of foreign mer-
chants living in enclaves such as London's Lombard Street.123 The
consequence was that English merchant law during that period lagged
behind Italy's innovative practices.
With the Atlantic eclipsing the Mediterranean during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries as the source of new avenues of trade, eco-
120 See, e.g., id. at 63, 311-12.
121 See WILLIAM M. BOWSKY, A MEDIEVAL ITALIAN COMMUNE: SIENA UNDER THE
NINE, 1287-1355, at 254-57 (198i); EDWARD D. ENGLISH, ENTERPRISE AND LIABILITY INSIENESE BANKING, 1230-135 o , at 99-ioo (1988); 2 SAPORI, Le Compagnie Mercantili Toscane
del Dugento e dei Primi del Trecento: La Responsabilitd dei Compagni verso i Terzi, supra note 87,
at 804-05.
122 See, e.g., 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 67 (3d ed. 1982).
123 Id.
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nomic fortunes shifted northward, first toward the Low Countries and
then in England's direction. The development of entity shielding pro-
ceeded apace. 12 4  By the end of the seventeenth century, England had
become the commercial leader. It enjoyed a natural advantage in en-
dowments of coal, which helped boost it to the van of the Industrial
Revolution in the eighteenth century. Although institutional conserva-
tism prevented English law from developing in lockstep with com-
merce, economic expansion eventually brought sufficient pressure to
bear, and by the mid-nineteenth century the country had produced
124 Although we do not pursue here the further evolution of law and commerce on the European
Continent, we note that by the end of the sixteenth century, the City of Antwerp had enacted stat-
utes that established entity shielding for partnerships. In relevant part, one of these statutes reads
roughly as follows:
Concerning the Partnership and Jointly Held Property
i. Each member of a commercial partnership is jointly and severally liable for the debts
of the partnership, but can seek indemnification from the partnership.
2. Each member of a partnership may, for the term of the partnership, incur debts and
dispose of assets on its behalf.
3. Likewise, whenever merchants have different commercial partnerships in different
places, one partnership and its assets are not liable for the debts of the other partnership.
4. Also, the creditors of one partnership, establishment, or shop have a prior claim 
on its
assets over the creditors of another partnership, establishment, or shop.
5. The assets of a partnership may not be seized, executed upon, or subjected to liens to
satisfy the personal obligations of its individual members.
6. But a personal creditor may lay claim to, and seize, a merchant's interest in a part-
nership that remains after all of the company's debts are discharged.
Impressae, Titel LII (i582), reprinted in 2 G. DE LONG9, COUTUMES DU PAYS ET DUCH9 DE
BRABANT: QUARTIER D'ANVERS 392, 392-95 (Brussels, Minist~re de la Justice 1871).
A second statute, in relevant part, reads:
Concerning the Partnership and Jointly Held Assets
25. So if one of the partners is indebted in his own name, even with regard to the dowry
of his wife or similar privileged debts, the assets of the partnership are not liable, and
may not be seized, paid out, or pawned, nor can they be paid out as compensation.
26. Similarly, when merchants have different partnerships, establishments, or shops in
different locations, each partnership, establishment, or shop is not liable for the others'
debts. Partnerships, establishments, or shops may not compensate or cross-subsidize one
another.
27. But when the creditors of a partnership, establishment, or shop have been paid, if
there is anything left over, those who are owed debts by individual partners or by their
other partnerships, establishments, or shops may make their claim, whether this is by
way of compensation or by the seizure and paying out of the assets, and each is to be
paid according to the occasion, preference, or advantage of his debt.
Compilatae, Titel IX, § 2 (16o9), reprinted in 4 G. DE LONGP, COUTUMES DU PAYS ET DUCH9
DE BRABANT QUARTIER D'ANVERS 173, 182-85 (Brussels, Ministare de la Justice 5874). Al-
though it is not entirely clear, the reference in the statute to "partnership, establishment, or shop"
(our translation of "compaignie, negotiatie, comptoor oft winckele") appears to establish location-
based entity shielding of the form, described supra pp. 1368-69, found in medieval Italy. Prelimi-
nary research suggests that entity shielding of this form, created by municipal or local statutes,
was common throughout Middle Europe at that time. We are grateful to Andreas Fleckner for
his enterprising research into medieval and early modern municipal and local statutes on the Con-
tinent, and to Lisenka Van Holewinckel and Emily Kadens for help with translation of the stat-
utes reproduced here.
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useful, general-purpose commercial entities offering both weak and
strong versions of entity shielding.
A. The Early Joint Stock Companies
England's most celebrated commercial enterprises at the beginning
of the modern period were its joint stock companies, which led the na-
tion's charge overseas for conquest and profit during the Age of Ex-
ploration. England was not, in fact, the joint stock company's creator
- that distinction belonging to Genoa, which starting in the four-
teenth century sold shares in state-backed monopolies engaged in a va-
riety of ventures, including the mining of salt, the importation of coral,
alum, and mercury, and, most spectacularly, the conquest of two Medi-
terranean islands.125 Though innovative, these Genoese enterprises
were relatively small affairs by modern standards, and indeed man-
aged to operate under a rule whereby every owner had to consent to
any sale of a firm's shares 126 - an arrangement that is feasible only if
owners are not numerous. By contrast, the trade opportunities that
opened during the sixteenth century to European nations with ocean
access required fleets of deep-water ships and large overseas posts -
and thus organizational forms capable of amalgamating capital pools
of unprecedented scale.127 While Portugal and Spain responded by or-ganizing and funding intercontinental trade through the state," 8 the
Dutch and especially the English followed the Genoese example of
combining private investment with state-granted monopoly privileges.
Guilds of traders, often operating through commenda-like arrange-
ments, were issued charters that included exclusive privileges to trade
in particular regions of the world.129 Although these chartered com-
panies at first divided the cargo among the investors at the end of each
voyage, 1 30 the inefficiency of such frequent asset liquidations led the
Dutch Estates General in 1623 to grant the Dutch East India Com-
pany perpetual existence.131 While shareholders lost their power to
withdraw at will, they were compensated with a new right to sell their
125 CIZAKCA, supra note i15, at 29-30; MITCHELL, supra note 88, at 138-39.
126 CIZAKCA, supra note i15, at 31.
127 See generally Barry Supple, The Nature of Enterprise, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF EUROPE 393, 416-23 (E.E. Rich & C.H. Wilson eds., 1977) (discussing new chal-lenges of scale in financing faced by merchants engaged in international trade at the close of the
Middle Ages).
128 E.L.J. Coornaert, European Economic Institutions and the New World: The CharteredCompanies, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 220, 228-29 (E.E. Rich
& C.H. Wilson eds., 1967).
129 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 199-202 (2d ed. 1982); Sam-
uel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 18oo (pt. i), 2 HARV. L. REV.
105, 1o9 (j888).130 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 193-94; Williston, supra note 129, at 1 io.
131 See CIZAKCA, supra note i15, at 46; Coornaert, supra note 128, at 258.
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shares without the consent of other owners,1 32 a compromise that rec-
onciled a company's need for fixed capital with a shareholder's need
for liquidity. The success of this arrangement prompted imitation in
England's own East India Company, as well as in several other joint
stock enterprises chartered by the English Crown or Parliament in the
seventeenth century.133
The best evidence indicates that the English and Dutch chartered
joint stock companies featured strong entity shielding, which would
have equipped the companies to amalgamate large volumes of capital
from many owners. These companies enjoyed liquidation protection
against shareholders, who, as we indicate above, were required to sur-
render their withdrawal rights. And while direct evidence on the point
is lacking, circumstances and logic suggest that these firms enjoyed
liquidation protection against shareholders' personal creditors as well.
The strongest evidence that these companies enjoyed liquidation pro-
tection against personal creditors, and thus strong entity shielding, is
the fact that their shares were tradable. In the absence of liquidation
protection against personal creditors, excessive borrowing by any
owner would have threatened a firm's going-concern value, and thus
given owners a collective interest in restricting membership in the
firm. Fully tradable shares, by contrast, are consistent with a lack of
concern about any given shareholder's personal borrowing habits, and
thus with liquidation protection against personal creditors.
134 And the
fact that shares could be seized and then sold by personal creditors
would have provided a means to pay off the claims of the personal
creditors of a bankrupt owner without forcing a payout from the firm
itself. Similar logic explains why the death of a shareholder did not
dissolve an English joint stock company13S - the shares instead de-
volving to heirs 136 - even though the demise of a partner did dissolve
an English partnership. 1
37
132 Coornaert, supra note 128, at 257-58.
133 See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 209; Williston, supra note 129, at io.
134 Another factor suggestive of strong entity shielding in the joint stock companies is that legal
sources referred to those companies as "corporate" bodies. See, e.g., An Act for Better Securing
Certain Powers and Privileges Intended To Be Granted by His Majesty by Two Charters for As-
surance of Ships and Merchandizes at Sea, 6 Geo., c. 18, § 18 (1719) (Eng.). The terminology of
incorporation then (as today) implied both perpetual existence and that the entity rather than its
members owned the joint property. 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
483-84, 489 (5th ed. 1982).
135 See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 2o2.
136 Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before x8oo (pt. 2), 2 HARV.
L. REV. 149, 163 (1888).
137 ANDREW BISSET, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP
INCLUDING THE LAW RELATING TO RAILWAY AND OTHER JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 83
(London, V & R Stevens 1847).
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A notable common feature of these Genoese, Dutch, and English
firms is that they typically enjoyed monopoly privileges, which was
likely due to the perceived national importance of the activities in
which they engaged. An interesting and open question is whether
there is also a relationship between their monopoly privileges and the
fact that these firms were among the first in Europe to feature strong
entity shielding. It is possible that the scale of enterprise resulting
from monopoly would have deepened the market for a firm's shares,
thus increasing the attractiveness of share transferability relative to
withdrawal as a source of liquidity. Another (and potentially comple-
mentary) hypothesis is that the state had an independent reason to en-
dow these firms with liquidation protection because the firms as going
concerns provided significant public benefits. The prospect of mo-
nopolistic revenues would then have been a device for attracting inves-
tors otherwise leery of control-person opportunism that could not be
disciplined through shareholder withdrawal threats.
Owner shielding - in the form of full limited liability - was also
available in the joint stock companies, a trait that carried over from
their origins in the commenda. Importantly, however, full limited li-
ability was not universal, at least in the English companies. Rather,
the charters of English companies specified whether and when share-
holders could be called upon to make additional capital contributions,
a mechanism by which the degree of owner shielding could be varied
to suit business necessity.1 38 Not all chartered joint stock companies
opted for full limited liability, an early illustration that limited liability
is not a prerequisite of tradable shares.
An important implication of the English and Dutch chartered joint
stock companies is that commercial firms had been established by the
early seventeenth century with all of the elements of the modern busi-
ness corporation: strong entity shielding, limited liability, and tradable
shares. As we emphasize above, these elements are complementary,
and it is thus unsurprising that they arose as a package. And this
package proved popular, setting off a surge in applications for com-
pany charters.139 The English Parliament was, however, restrained inits response, issuing only a few corporate charters in the first half of
the eighteenth century, and only gradually picking up the pace thereaf-
ter.140 Indeed, it would not be until the nineteenth century that Eng-lish enterprises enjoyed a general right to the company form. Part of
the explanation for this delay lies with interest-group politics, wherein
138 See Williston, supra note 136, at 16o; see also 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 204.
139 Williston, supra note 129, at 111-12.
140 Id.
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incumbent firms sought protection against well-financed upstarts.
141
But the types of charter that were granted suggest that Parliament also
wished to protect creditors and small shareholders against the oppor-
tunism that rules of strong asset partitioning invite. Charters were
most often awarded to firms that invested in large fixed assets, such as
canals, that could not easily be opportunistically dissipated or diverted
by control persons at the expense of owners or firm creditors. Mean-
while, in manufacturing, the sector most strongly associated with the
Industrial Revolution, applications for corporate charters were usually
rejected.1 4 2
Parliament's grudging policy on charters likely caused merchants to
seek other entity forms suited to the financial demands of England's
commercial expansion. By the end of the seventeenth century, two
such entities had been developed. One was the general partnership,
reformed by common law courts to provide weak entity shielding.
The other was the unincorporated joint stock company, constituted as
a strong entity by grafting the trust form onto the partnership. The
entity shielding provided by both of these forms would have made
them useful for combining investment capital from multiple owners,
thus increasing their attractiveness as the scale of enterprise expanded
during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. We ad-
dress these entity forms in turn.
B. Bankruptcy and Partnership in England
As the theory we set forth in Part III suggests, and the commercial
history of medieval Italy corroborates, a bankruptcy system is a pre-
cursor to the rule of weak entity shielding that characterizes the tradi-
tional partnership. But while the merchant class that controlled Ital-
ian city-states began constructing sophisticated bankruptcy systems in
the thirteenth century, England's courts, less under the sway of the lo-
cal commercial interest, 143 relied during the Middle Ages on more
primitive methods for coaxing assets out of debtors. Throughout the
medieval period, England more than most parts of Europe relied on
imprisonment to pressure defaulting debtors into making good on obli-
141 See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 172o-i844, at 6o-6i (2000) (discussing an incumbent firm's reaction
to smaller "bubble" firms).
142 See BISHOP C. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
ENGLAND 180o-i867, at i6 (1936). Manufacturing, service, and financial firms that received
charters were often, in effect if not in name, mutual companies or cooperatives owned principally
or exclusively by suppliers or customers, who also would have been the firms' principal creditors.
The identity of owners and creditors eliminated the hazard that one group might exploit the other.
See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 246-86 (1996) (discussing
the historical development and role of banking and mutual insurance companies).
143 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 122, at i1 9 .
1379THE RISE OF THE FIRM2006]
HeinOnline  -- 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1379 2005-2006
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vo1. 119:1333
gations. 144 And an insolvent debtor's assets went to the creditor who
sued to attach them first, a procedure resulting in what a sixteenth-
century Londoner described as a "first come, first served" system that
conferred windfalls on whichever creditors were best positioned to
learn of a merchant's misfortunes. 145 It is thus unsurprising that Eng-
land - unlike Italy - appears not to have developed rules of weak
entity shielding during the Middle Ages. 146
The prosperity of the sixteenth century brought heightened demand
for reception of Southern Europe's more sophisticated rules of com-
mercial law, including its rules of bankruptcy.47 As with company
charters, however, bankruptcy reform issued from Parliament slug-
gishly. A 1542 statute provided for the basic elements of a pro rata
bankruptcy system, 148 and an act in 1571 empowered Chancery to ap-
point commissions, constituted in part of creditors, for valuing debtor
estates, approving creditor claims, and apportioning assets.1 49 Severe
limitations, however, led to the system's infrequent use during the six-
teenth century. For example, the system applied only to "traders" - a
classification that did not include farmers, innkeepers, or mere share-
holders of joint stock companies.1 5 0  And the commissions could not
discharge a debtor's remaining unpaid obligations upon distributing an
estate, and thus provided little incentive to debtors to invoke them
voluntarily.1s1 The system gradually improved, and thus experienced
wider use, during the seventeenth century: statutes enacted in 1604
and 1623 enhanced the power of commissions to compel testimony and
avoid pre-insolvency conveyances,1 5 2 and Chancery became active
during the latter half of the century in reviewing commission rul-
144 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 231; see also 2 EDWARD CHRISTIAN, THE ORIGIN,
PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW BOTH IN ENGLAND AND
IRELAND 8-9 (London, W. Clarke & Sons, 2d ed. 1818) (discussing broad powers of commission-
ers in sanctioning debtors and presenting cases in which the arrest of a debtor was sought).145 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 231.
146 See GERARD MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL LEx MERCATORIA OR THE ANCIENT
LAW-MERCHANT 16o-6i (photo. reprint 1997) (1622) (suggesting that the rules of asset partition-
ing under the medieval law merchant were confined to the European continent).
147 See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 122, at 129.
148 An Acte Againste Suche Persones as Doo Make Bankrupte, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542)
(Eng.).
149 An Acte Touchyng Orders for Banckruptes, 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1571) (Eng.).
150 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 237 n.4.
151 Id. at 240. The additional powers of commissions to imprison, pillory, and cut the ears off
debtors also probably limited the frequency of their voluntary invocation. Id. at 238-39.
152 An Acte for the Discripcon of a Banckrupt and Reliefe of Credytors, 21 Jac., c. 19 (1623)(Eng.); An Act for the Better Reliefe of the Creditors Againste Suche as Shall Become Bankrupts,
i Jac., c. 15 (1604) (Eng.); see also i EDWARD CHRISTIAN, THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND
PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW 2 7-30, 43 n.4 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1812).
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ings. 1 53 This last development led to the articulation of rules that in-
creased the predictability of bankruptcy outcomes.
The most important such rule for our purposes was weak entity
shielding for partnerships, which Chancery formalized in the 1683 case
Craven v. Knight154 by ruling that the assets of a bankrupt partnership
must be applied first to the claims of partnership creditors, and that
only the excess, if any, could be made available to the partners'
personal creditors.1 5 5  The Craven result was paired with a rule of
weak owner shielding in 1715, when Chancery held in Ex parte
Crowder156 that a partner's personal creditors enjoyed first claim to
the partner's personal assets, and that only those personal assets
remaining after the personal creditors had been paid in full could be
given over to creditors of the partnership. 15 7 The regime created by
the combined holdings of Craven and Crowder is known as the "jingle
rule," ostensibly because its symmetrical treatment of partnership and
personal creditors makes it easy to remember. It remains in effect in
England today, and was in force in the United States until 1978.158
The rule of weak entity shielding established by Craven is taken for
granted by modern scholars, and the case itself is all but forgotten.
159
But the change in the law was conspicuous to contemporaries. Early
bankruptcy treatises make much of Craven and the subsequent deci-
sions that reaffirmed its rule of entity shielding. 160 These treatises do
not, however, provide a clear explanation for the result in Craven, nor
for that matter the result in Crowder, and neither do the recorded
opinions in those cases.
We believe that the Craven and Crowder decisions are best ex-
plained as complements to the English bankruptcy system, which by
the late seventeenth century had reached an advanced stage of devel-
opment. As we have indicated, rules of weak asset partitioning are in-
consistent with a "first come, first served" method for distributing
debtor assets because asset partitioning prioritizes creditors according
153 See 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 129, at 244.
154 (1683) 21 Eng. Rep. 664 (Ch.).
155 Id. at 664.
156 (715) 23 Eng. Rep. iO64 (Ch.).
157 Id. at IO64.
158 See supra p. 1339.
159 Notable exceptions are Joshua Getzler and Mike Macnair, who in a recent paper examine
the case law development of the jingle rule in detail, and - using our terminology of asset parti-
tioning - explore the sharp doctrinal struggles within the Court of Chancery over the rule. See
Getzler & Macnair, supra note 66.
160 See I CHRISTIAN, supra note 152, at 297; ARCHIBALD CULLEN, PRINCIPLES OF THE
BANKRUPT LAW 459-73 (London, T. Cadell & W. Davies 18oo); SOAME WHITTAKER, THE
LAW OF BANKRUPTS, THEIR CREDITORS, AND ASSIGNEES: FROM THE ISSUING THE
COMMISSION TO THE ALLOWANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR 67
(London, J. Stratford i8oi).
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to the nature of their claims rather than when they assert them. Eng-
land's adoption of weak asset partitioning thus probably could not
have preceded the development of an effective bankruptcy system dur-
ing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And the formalization of
these rules was not possible before judicial review of bankruptcy
commission rulings became common in the late seventeenth century.161
Once, in turn, an effective pro rata bankruptcy system was estab-
lished, rules of weak asset partitioning would have reduced the costs of
administering that system, increasing their likelihood of adoption. In-
deed, the jingle rule made the procedures used in the seventeenth cen-
tury for the bankruptcy of an English partnership particularly easy to
administer. Under those procedures, the simultaneous bankruptcy of a
partnership and its partners resulted in the appointment of a joint
commission for the partnership and a separate commission for each
individual partner. Creditors were required to choose only one com-
mission - separate or joint - before which to press their claims. 162
The jingle rule enabled each commission to distribute the assets under
its purview independently of the decisions made by other commissions
appointed upon the bankruptcy of the same partnership.
Further developments during the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries permitted the English partnership to add a degree of liquidation
protection to the priority rule recognized in Craven, and thus to transi-
tion from weak to strong entity shielding. Specifically, liquidation pro-
tection in the partnership arose through judicial enforcement of
agreements among partners not to withdraw before the expiration of a
specified term. Such agreements give rise to a so-called term partner-
ship, as contrasted with the default rule of partnership at will, under
which any partner could leave the partnership and withdraw his share
of firm assets at any time. Term partnership agreements can be en-
forced in various ways, 16 3 but at least by the late nineteenth century
England had settled on the particularly strict rule whereby a partner
could neither withdraw any portion of firm assets nor renounce liabil-
161 Commission members included merchants, many of whom would have been familiar with
Italian commercial practices. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note i22, at 129-35, i5o; 8 HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note i29, at 207. There is therefore a possibility that commissions had been apply-
ing rules of weak asset partitioning on an ad hoc basis before Chancery formalized such a rule in
its Craven decision.
162 See CULLEN, supra note 16o, at 451-59.
163 Enforcement regimes less severe than the one in effect in England by the late nineteenth
century include allowing a partner who withdraws early to receive his share of net firm assets
subject to an offset for breach of the partnership agreement, and allowing the partner to renounce
liability for future but not past firm debts. In contrast with the English regime, American part-
nership law during the nineteenth century took an ambiguous position among these milder alter-
natives. See infra section VII.A, pp. 1388-94.
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ity for future firm obligations before the specified term had expired. 164
This rule allowed English partners to opt for a significant degree of
liquidation protection among themselves, at least for the duration of
their agreement. A measure of liquidation protection against personal
creditors appears to have been possible as well, by use of a clause in a
partnership agreement specifying that a bankrupt partner's share
would be paid out only through disbursements of partnership income
made in the normal course of business. The best evidence suggests
that courts would have allowed partnerships to modify the default
rule, under which the bankruptcy of a partner dissolved even a term
partnership and empowered the bankruptcy trustee to liquidate the
partnership assets. Indeed, American courts later reached a similar
conclusion, as we describe in the next section.
65
We defer our analysis of the likely reasons for the strengthening of
the partnership to our discussion of the United States, where the part-
nership form underwent a similar transformation during the nine-
teenth century. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the addi-
tion of entity shielding to the partnership in England may at least
partially explain why the partnership form was able to give the joint
stock company such a long run for its money, remaining the dominant
form of jointly owned enterprise until the twentieth century.
166
C. England's Proto-Corporation:
The Unincorporated Joint Stock Company
The so-called unincorporated - meaning unchartered - joint
stock company was a business form improvised to mimic the chartered
company during a time when parliamentary obduracy and demand for
the company form had combined to create a charter shortage. The at-
tribute of the chartered company most coveted by investors appears to
have been share tradability, which was reproduced with some success
in the unincorporated companies through a union of the trust form
and the partnership. The result was a partnership-like form whose as-
sets were held in trust for the partners by trustees whom the partners
had themselves selected.
164 Only when the partnership was no longer viable and the withdrawing partner was not act-
ing opportunistically would courts order early dissolution. See Moss v. Elphick, (0IO) All E.R.
Rep. Ext. 1202-03 (K.B.) (noting the rule's codification by the Partnership Act, 53 & 54 Vict., c.
39, § 32 (i89 o ) (Eng.)); NATHANIEL LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP
646-50 (London, W. Maxwell & Son 1888) (describing the pre-i89o common law rule).
165 Unfortunately, it seems that few English courts have ruled on this precise issue. We note,
moreover, that the lack of clear authority would have made such liquidation protection against
personal creditors less dependable than the liquidation protection offered by the corporation.
166 Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 2o, at 6.
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The use of the trust form to achieve tradable shares is normally ex-
plained in terms of ease of litigation. 167 During the eighteenth century,
an English partnership typically could initiate and answer lawsuits
only through use of the names of all partners, which was a problem if
share tradability kept the roster of partners in constant flux. The trust
permitted suit in the names of the trustees, who remained the same
even while shares changed hands.
While the trust certainly would have been useful in the litigation
context, we believe that it may have enabled tradability of shares more
directly by providing the unincorporated companies with strong entity
shielding. As we note above, strong entity shielding facilitates share
tradability because it, by dint of liquidation protection, allows share-
holders to be unconcerned if shares fall into the hands of an insolvent
investor. During the seventeenth century it likely became settled doc-
trine that a trustee's personal creditors could not levy on trust assets,
even though the trustee held those assets in his own name. 16s English
trust law also seems to have arrived by the seventeenth century at the
modern rule for multi-beneficiary trusts whereby neither a beneficiary
nor his creditors can force liquidation of trust assets, 69 such creditors
instead enjoying at most a right to seize the beneficiary's share of the
trust's periodic income distributions. In short, the trust by the late
seventeenth century offered full liquidation protection, a trait that
would have caught the eye of businessmen looking for a way to con-
vert their partnerships into strong entities. For these reasons, we be-
lieve it to be no coincidence that the unincorporated joint stock com-
panies first appeared in the 168os, and proliferated thereafter.
Strong entity shielding was not, however, accompanied in the unin-
corporated companies by limited liability. The unincorporated compa-
nies would have enjoyed weak owner shielding no later than the
Crowder decision of 1715 due to their utilization of the partnership
form. But the mere addition of the common law trust probably was
not a reliable means for raising the level of owner shielding to full lim-
ited liability, as indeed it would not be today. 170 Many unincorporated
167 See HARRIS, supra note 141, at 147.
168 In contrast to the English trust, the Islamic analogue, the waqf, was a highly rigid device
that permitted little innovation and did not draw a bright line between the personal assets of the
trustee and the assets of the trust. Timur Kuran has argued that these limitations prevented the
waqf from evolving into a proto-business entity. See Timur Kuran, The Provision of Public Goods
Under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
841, 861-69 (2oo).
169 See, e.g., FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS i4i,
196-97 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) (discussing the rights of creditors against members of a
society built on a trust settlement).
170 See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 459-63 (1998).
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companies therefore sought limited liability contractually, such as
through clauses in agreements with firm and personal creditors, by
specifying limited liability in the partnership agreement and on firm
letterhead, and by including "limited" in the firm's name.' 71 But
courts did not definitively endorse these measures until well into the
nineteenth century, leaving a rule of limited liability for the unincorpo-
rated companies in doubt during most of the period in which they
were important.17 2
In addition to strong entity shielding, contemporaneous develop-
ments in financial markets would likely have catalyzed the trade in
unincorporated company shares. Shares in the chartered companies
were changing hands vigorously by the 169os, largely due to an under-
taking by the Bank of England and the East India Company to fi-
nance the rapidly expanding national debt through stock offerings.
17 3
The chartered South Sea Company, having abandoned overseas trade,
attempted the same in 1713.174 Each of these schemes was quickly fol-
lowed by spikes in the number of unincorporated companies, 175 which
likely were able to piggyback their share distributions on the stock
market infrastructure that had arisen to support trade in the chartered
firms. As with the chartered companies, robust trade in the shares of
the unincorporated companies would also have reduced the cost of liq-
uidation protection by making tradable shares a more effective alter-
native to withdrawal as a source of liquidity.
To be sure, only the largest chartered companies of the eighteenth
century, and evidently very few of the unchartered variety, saw a level
of trade in their shares that would be considered active by modern
standards. 76  But liquidity is relative, and the benchmark here was
the typical partnership interest, which in early modern England would
have been largely illiquid due to its personal nature.
171 PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 32 n.65 (6th ed.
1997); HARRIS, supra note 141, at 140, 143; HUNT, supra note 142, at ioo-oi. The success of un-
chartered joint stock companies in achieving tradable shares despite the doubtful nature of their
limited liability further illustrates that limited liability is not necessary for making shares
tradable.
172 The larger unincorporated joint stock companies probably did enjoy a substantial degree of
limited liability as a practical matter. As Gower puts it, personal shareholder liability was
"largely illusory" because litigating against a large and shifting pool of investors was very costly
under the partnership law of the time. DAVIES, supra note 17 1, at 32; see also RONALD RALPH
FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 36 (1923). In addi-
tion, wealthy shareholders with liability concerns could protect their personal assets by investing
through intermediaries (known as stags) or neglecting to sign the company's deed of settlement.
See DAVIES, supra note 171, at 32.
173 See HARRIS, supra note 141, at 53-57.
174 Id. at 56.
175 See id. at 57-63.
176 See id. at i18-27.
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A famous effort to suppress the unincorporated companies took
place in 1720 with the passage of the South Sea Company Act,'7 7 bet-
ter known as the Bubble Act. That statute forbade unincorporated
companies from selling shares and chartered companies from selling
their charters or engaging in lines of business that their charters did
not authorize. 17 8 While the Act remained on the books until 1825,
there was only one effort to enforce it - in 1722 - during the entire
eighteenth century. 179 The upshot is that the unincorporated compa-
nies continued to flourish despite their doubtful legality, to the point
that nearly one thousand were operating in England at the beginning
of the nineteenth century, 1 0 some with thousands of shareholder-
partners. The success of these firms was an embarrassment to the pa-
ternalistic arguments of the Bubble Act's defenders, and thus set the
stage for Parliament's accession to the modern corporate form.
D. General Incorporation Acts in the United Kingdom
More than a century's worth of pressure for a company form fea-
turing both free availability and unclouded legitimacy finally induced
Parliament in 1844 to enact a statute permitting incorporation as a
matter of right. 8 ' The statute also sought to remove the unincorpo-
rated companies from the margins of legality by requiring all partner-
ships with transferable shares or more than twenty-five members to
register as public corporations and follow uniform disclosure rules. 182
The 1844 statute did not explicitly provide for strong entity shield-
ing, apparently because by the nineteenth century that attribute was
understood to be inherent in the company form. For example, an 1837
statute 83 empowering the Crown to grant unincorporated companies
any of the privileges normally conferred in a charter of incorporation
made strong entity shielding explicit, 8 4 presumably to make clear that
such companies, though not fully incorporated, would nonetheless en-
177 6 Geo., c. 18 (1719).
178 HARRIS, supra note 141, at 118-27.
179 Id. at 78-79.
180 See HUNT, supra note 142, at 87.
181 See id. at 94.
182 Id. at 94-98.
183 An Act for Better Enabling Her Majesty To Confer Certain Powers and Immunities on
Trading and Other Companies, I Vict., c. 73 (1837) (Eng.).
184 Section 25 of the Act provides:
And be it enacted, That the Bankruptcy, Insolvency, or stopping Payment of any Officer
or Member of such Company or Body in his individual Capacity shall not be construed
to be the Bankruptcy, Insolvency, or stopping Payment of such Company or Body; and
that the Property and Effects of such Company or Body, and the Persons, Property, and
Effects of the individual Members or other individual Members thereof (as the Case
may be), shall, notwithstanding such Bankruptcy, Insolvency, or stopping Payment, be
liable to Execution or Diligence in the same Manner as if such Bankruptcy, Insolvency,
or stopping Payment had not taken place.
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joy the company form's standard rules of asset partitioning. Also, the
1844 statute reinforced entity shielding by imposing strong legal capi-
tal rules that were designed to prevent the draining of firm assets to
the detriment of firm creditors. In particular, a company's paid-in
capital could not be used for redemption of shares unless new shares
were issued for the same amount, and a net reduction of capital was
prohibited unless all objecting creditors were first paid off.'8s Al-
though such legal capital rules would also have facilitated limited li-
ability, the 1844 statute did not in fact permit that attribute. Only in
1855 was the statute amended to endorse limited liability, and even
then it was optional.'
8 6
Although Parliament had finally provided for incorporation as a
matter of right, the partnership nonetheless remained the dominant
form for enterprise for another half century or so. Only during the
twentieth century did the corporate form become commonplace among
even small- and medium-sized firms. The steps by which this change
occurred, and the economic developments that likely impelled it, are
most easily seen in the United States.
VII. THE MODERN PERIOD IN THE UNITED STATES
Notwithstanding the development of both weak and strong com-
mercial entity forms by the mid-nineteenth century, the choices avail-
able to business owners remained limited. Although almost any jointly
owned commercial firm could be (and by default usually was) a part-
nership, limitations on that form - such as a lack of complete liquida-
tion protection and limited liability, shares.that were not easily trans-
ferable, and the presumption that every owner was a firm agent -
made it unsuitable for many businesses. The only other important op-
tion was the corporation, and while that form generally lacked the
limitations of the partnership, it was burdened with other restrictions
that hampered its use by small-scale enterprises.
At the end of the twentieth century, by contrast, commercial actors
in many Western countries could fashion entities with almost any
combination of key structural attributes. The intervening period was
one of rapid transformation, in which legal systems both increased
freedom of contract for internal firm affairs and broadened the supply
of entity forms. The jurisdiction that best illustrates this transforma-
tion is the United States, both because the period corresponds with the
nation's emergence as the world's leading commercial power, and be-
cause America ultimately experienced the greatest proliferation of
commercial entity forms.
185 See BISSET, supra note 137, at 188.
186 HUNT, supra note 142, at 133-34.
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A. The Strengthening of the American Partnership
Initially a weak entity on the model of Craven and Crowder, the
American partnership had developed by the end of the twentieth cen-
tury to the point where owners could opt both for strong entity shield-
ing over a defined period and for limited liability.8 7  Even where
partners chose to retain their unilateral withdrawal right, American
law provided the partnership a high degree of liquidation protection
against personal creditors, thereby frequently preserving the firm's go-
ing-concern value upon a partner's insolvency. The growth of the
partnership into a modern commercial entity offering both strong en-
tity shielding and complete owner shielding corresponds with devel-
opments, such as superior accounting and valuation techniques and
greater commercial sophistication among courts, that protected owners
and creditors alike.
By the early nineteenth century., most American states had followed
England in adopting the jingle rule for the division of partnership as-
sets, thus lending the American partnership weak degrees of both en-
tity and owner shielding. 88 Pursuant to this regime, courts initially
held that personal judgment creditors of a partner could demand im-
mediate liquidation of partnership assets and reduction of the partner's
share to cash, even if the partnership was for a defined term that had
yet to expire or the partners had otherwise agreed among themselves
to restrict liquidation. 89 To reconcile a personal creditor's right to
demand liquidation with the partnership creditors' prior claim to
partnership assets, courts as a matter of course appointed a receiver
and assumed oversight of partnership assets when a partner became
insolvent. 190
Courts were aware, however, that forced liquidation could entail
significant destruction of going-concern value,' 9 ' and thus by the mid-
nineteenth century began seeking alternative devices for accommodat-
ing the claims of personal creditors. A personal creditor's primary
187 As we observe above, see supra note 45, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal explain the choice be-
tween the partnership and corporate forms in the late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-
century United States as a tradeoff between the protection from minority oppression offered by
the partnership and the ability to lock in capital offered by the corporation, both consequences of
the absence of a withdrawal right (liquidation protection against owners) in the corporation as
opposed to the partnership. Though that is a reasonable rough view, liquidation protection in the
partnership was, as we discuss here, in fact a more complicated matter. So, too, was minority pro-
tection via the withdrawal right in the corporation, as we note in our references to appraisal rights
and oppression remedies. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
188 See, e.g., Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. (S Tyng) 242, 243 (i8io).
189 See, e.g., Renton v. Chaplain, 9 N.J. Eq. 62, 64 (Ch. 1852); Marquand v. President of the
N.Y. Mfg. Co., 17 Johns. 525, 528-29 (N.Y. 1820).
190 See Randall v. Morrell, 17 N.J. Eq. 343, 346 (Ch. 1866).
191 See, e.g., Renton, 9 N.J. Eq. at 64.
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form of redress became sale of the partner's interest; forcing the part-
nership to reduce that interest to cash required the additional and
sometimes lengthy step of a suit for an accounting. 92  State legisla-
tures, in turn, empowered courts with equitable devices, such as gar-
nishment and constructive seizure, to substitute for liquidation.
193
This culminated in the late nineteenth century in the creation of the
judicial charging order, under which a defaulting partner's manage-
ment and control rights were preserved but his income stream was di-
verted to a personal creditor until the unpaid claim was satisfied.
194
Although a creditor with a charging order could compel liquidation of
the partnership after foreclosing on the partner's share, 195 foreclosure
required judicial approval, which normally was denied unless the in-
come stream was unlikely to suffice in a reasonable time. 196 Moreover,
under the Uniform Partnership Act 197 (UPA) - promulgated in 1914
and thereafter adopted by almost every state - a creditor who fore-
closed upon a share could not force liquidation of a partnership for a
term until the term had expired. 198 Some courts applying UPA have
recently demonstrated a reluctance to allow foreclosure even upon a
partnership at will unless the remaining partners have consented or
the court determines that a forced sale will not "unduly interfere with
the partnership business." 199
While UPA did provide for dissolution of the partnership upon the
formal bankruptcy of a partner,200 this seems to have been intended
more to protect the remaining partners and the partnership creditors
than to make assets available to personal creditors. UPA did not ex-
plicitly allow a bankrupt partner's trustee to force liquidation, al-
though it did empower him to petition a court for a liquidation or-
der.20 1 Some bankruptcy courts have recently been reluctant to grant
192 Cf. Deal v. Bogue, 20 Pa. 228, 234 (1853) (holding that a judgment creditor of one partner
may not seize and sell partnership property before the partnership is dissolved).
193 A. MECHELE DICKERSON, RICHARD B. HAGEDORN & FRANK W. SMITH, JR., THE
LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6.86, at 6-258 (2005).
194 J. Dennis Hynes, The Charging Order: Conflicts Between Partners and Creditors, 25 PAC.
L.J. i, 3-4 (1993).
195 Id. at 4-5.
196 See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
197 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001).
198 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. 404; HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A.
GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 516, 526 (2d ed. 199o).
199 Hellman v. Anderson, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Centurion Corp. v.
Crocker Nat'l Bank, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794, 797 (Ct. App. 1989) (permitting a sale when the remain-
ing partner consented); FDIC v. Birchwood Builders, Inc., 573 A.2d 182, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 199o) (holding that courts should be "circumspect" in ordering foreclosure pursuant to a
charging order).
200 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31(5), 6 U.L.A. 370.
201 See id. § 37, 6 U.L.A. at 470 (stating that any partner's legal representative or assignee,
"upon cause shown, may obtain winding up by the court").
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such petitions, however, emphasizing that typically a trustee can in-
stead convert the partner's interest to cash by selling it.1o2 And when
a partner undergoes Chapter ii reorganization rather than Chapter 7
liquidation, most courts have held that state laws adopting UPA's
automatic-dissolution provision conflict with the purposes of the fed-
eral bankruptcy code and thus are unenforceable.203
An interesting aspect of these developments is the possibility of
partnerships exhibiting a degree of liquidation protection against part-
ners' personal creditors that is even stronger than the degree exhibited
against the partners themselves. The question whether partners enjoy
a withdrawal right is primarily one of contractual interpretation, and
courts normally would have little reason to override an agreement
among partners to permit dissolution at will. But a personal creditor's
right to force dissolution of a partnership is ultimately a question of
property law, giving courts (and legislatures) greater latitude to fashion
remedies that both protect the interests of personal creditors and pre-
serve a firm's going-concern value. This allows for the possibility of
liquidation protection against personal creditors even when such pro-
tection against partners themselves is, by their own choice, lacking. In
this way, American law treats liquidation protection against personal
creditors not as a mere backstop to liquidation protection among own-
ers, but rather as a valuable device in its own right, providing addi-
tional protection to the going-concern value of a business.
As American law moved away from automatic payout of an insol-
vent partner's share, it also became more tolerant of alternatives to
liquidation for fixing the value of that share. Courts had traditionally
viewed conversion of all assets to cash through public auction as the
most accurate way to ascertain a firm's value.10 4  Accordingly, UPA
provided for full liquidation in most instances when a partner left a
202 See, e.g., Cutler v. Cutler (In re Cutler), 165 B.R. 275, 280-82 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); see
also Manning v. Nuthatch Hill Assocs., 831 F.2d 205, 21o n.io (ioth Cir. 1987) (raising the ques-
tion whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts Colorado's provision that bankruptcy of a partner
dissolves the partnership). But see Turner v. Cent. Nat'l Bank, 468 F.2d 590, 591 (7th Cir. 1972)(per curiam) (commenting that the trustee of a partner may demand payout of the partnership
interest after an accounting and the payment of partnership debts).
203 See Siegal v. Siegal (In re Siegal), 19o B.R. 639, 646 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996); LeRoux v.
Summit nv. & Dev. Corp. (In re LeRoux), 167 B.R. 318, 320-22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); Nizny v.
Nizny (In re Nizny), 175 B.R. 934, 939 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 1i6
B.R. 964, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 199o); In re Corky Foods Corp., 85 B.R. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1988); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985). But see Ca-
tron v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 624, 628-29 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); Harms v. Harms (In
re Harms), io B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. i98I); Durham v. Sw. Developers Joint Venture, 996
P.2d 911, 917 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
204 See Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 392 (Md. 1999) (discussing the traditional preference for
liquidation); accord Davis v. Davis, 366 P.2d 857, 859 (Colo. i96i).
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firm. 0 5 During the twentieth century, however, courts began permit-
ting less costly valuation methods, such as division of assets in kind or
buyout of the departing partner's share according to a formula
0 6
Courts initially endorsed such alternatives only when the partnership
lacked outstanding debt,2 0 7 but in the late twentieth century even this
qualification was relaxed. 0 8 Consistent with this development, the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 (RUPA) provides for buyout
of a partner's share - by either the partnership or a third party -
rather than liquidation in many instances where the partner dissociates
but the partnership continues.2 0 9
With liquidation no longer viewed as the only or even best way to
accommodate the interests of personal creditors, the conceptual path
was clear for full enforcement, against partners as well as third parties,
of agreements among partners to waive their withdrawal rights and
thereby imbue a partnership with strong entity shielding. Partners
had long been able to create a significant degree of liquidation protec-
tion among themselves, largely because they could deduct damages
from the cash payout owed a partner who withdrew early from a part-
nership for a term. 10 But UPA codified an even better remedy by rec-
ognizing a term partnership's ability, with leave of court, to dispatch a
prematurely exiting partner with a bond rather than cash.
2 11 And
RUPA goes even further by shifting the burden to the partner who
disassociates "wrongfully" (that is, early) to prove that immediate buy-
out will not cause "undue hardship to the business"; otherwise, the
partner gets nothing until completion of the specified term or under-
taking.2 1 2 RUPA also states that dissociation because of a partner's
personal bankruptcy is wrongful,2 13 and thus makes clear that the
trustee of a bankrupt partner in a defined-term partnership has no
right to immediate payout of the partner's share. The upshot is that
partners now may opt for strong entity shielding, including liquidation
protection against both themselves and their personal creditors, at least
for the duration of a specified term or undertaking.
205 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(I), 6 U.L.A. 487; see also Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 280 N.W.2d 335,
337 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
206 For an early example, see Dow v. Beals, 268 N.Y.S. 425, 427 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
207 See Logoluso v. Logoluso, 43 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Rinke v. Rinke, 48
N.W.2d 201, 207 (Mich. 1951); Nicholes v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 820, 827-28 (Or. 1975).
208 See Manning v. Nuthatch Hill Assocs., 37 B.R. 755, 76o (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984), modified,
831 F.2d 205 (ioth Cir. 1987); Arnold v. Burgess, 747 P2d 1315, 1322 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
209 See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701 (1996).
210 See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 194.
211 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. 487 (2oo).
212 REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 7 oI(h).
213 Id. § 6o2(b)(2)(iii).
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Besides continuing to enhance the power of partners to achieve
strong entity shielding, American law in the late twentieth century also
provided a new option with respect to owner shielding. Although
states had made the limited partnership available since the nineteenth
century, that form provided limited liability only to the passive part-
ners. During the 199os, however, every state enacted a Limited Liabil-
ity Partnership (LLP) statute that empowered active partners to opt
for limited liability as well. 2 14 LLP statutes otherwise largely incorpo-
rate RUPA, including its provisions for entity shielding.215 Interest-
ingly, the introduction of the LLP came shortly after federal law had
eliminated even weak owner shielding for partnerships.216 These
movements of federal and state law, pushing the degree of owner
shielding in the partnership in seemingly opposite directions, are rec-
oncilable when understood as pursuing the common goal of increasing
options for business owners. When the partnership was the only op-
tion for small firms, weak owner shielding provided a reasonable
tradeoff: it inhibited opportunism toward firm creditors by making
partners personally liable for firm debts, and it also facilitated personal
borrowing by granting a partner's creditors first claim to his personal
assets. But changes in the corporate form during the twentieth cen-
tury made that form more useful to small-business owners. Because
the corporation provides limited liability, these changes allowed federal
lawmakers to refashion the partnership for dedicated use by owners
who wish to maximize firm creditworthiness through full pledges of
their personal assets in support of firm debts. By enacting the LLP
statutes, the states then provided owners the further option of
combining complete owner shielding with the other attributes of a
partnership.
American partnership law thus now offers strong entity shielding
for a defined term as well as complete owner shielding. These attrib-
utes come A la carte: partners may opt for either, neither, or both. And
even if partners do not opt for liquidation protection among them-
selves, the law - by use of the charging order and other innovations
214 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, AND THE
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2ooi), at § i.oi(e), at 15 (2005). The LLP form is also
available to limited partnerships, giving rise to the Limited Liability Limited Partnership (LLLP),in which both general and limited partners enjoy owner shielding. Id. §§ 5, 5.02, at 191, 195-96.
215 Id. § r.oi(e), at 15 & app. B. Four states - California, Nevada, New York, and Oregon -
allow the LLP form to be used only by professional firms, such as those of lawyers or accountants.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 6roi(8)(A) (West Supp. 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.020(8) (Lex-
isNexis 2004); N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 12 I-15oo(a) (McKinney Supp. 2o06); OR. REV. STAT. § 67.500(a)
(2003).
216 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 723, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606-07
(codified at ii U.S.C. § 723 (2000)).
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- affords partnerships a high degree of liquidation protection against
partners' personal creditors.
Several contemporaneous developments appear to have contributed
to the strengthening of the American partnership over the last two
centuries. One theme running through the history is increased reliance
upon sophisticated accounting techniques and other methods for valu-
ing a business. For example, in the early twentieth century, courts and
legislatures generally countenanced valuations based only on book
value or other methods that excluded "good-will,"
'2 17 and were thus,
because they omitted going-concern value, no better than a liquidation
sale. By contrast, RUPA's buyout provision explicitly requires consid-
eration of going-concern value, 2 18 thus authorizing a potentially more
accurate approach. Increases in the accuracy and reliability of valua-
tion methods may also explain RUPA's greater reliance on buyout
rather than liquidation for paying out a departing partner's share.
Similarly, more accurate valuation methods would tend to decrease the
implied discount rate applied to a business's future income stream,
thus making courts more willing to rely upon the charging order to
satisfy claims of personal creditors. For the same reason, a partner's
share should now fetch a higher price if sold, increasing the attractive-
ness of sale relative to withdrawal as a device for providing liquidity
to the claims of an owner or his personal creditors.
A related trend is an increase in the effectiveness and thus useful-
ness of courts as arbitrators of internal partnership disputes. Both
UPA and RUPA enable judges to order dissolution on "equitable"
grounds, including for conduct by a partner that makes continuing the
business impracticable.2 19  Courts equipped with superior valuation
techniques should be better able - and thus more willing - to under-
take an assessment of whether a partner's conduct as a firm manager
should be enjoined as contrary to the interests of his copartners. The
availability of such judicial review would, in turn, make partners more
willing to forgo the right of unilateral withdrawal as a means for polic-
ing exploitative conduct.
Better valuation techniques, combined with the power of courts to
order liquidation for cause, would reduce the costs of strong entity
shielding among owners. Increased confidence among American
courts in their ability to value partnership interests and arbitrate in-
ternal firm disputes would also increase their willingness to deny at-
tempts by personal creditors to force liquidation of even a partnership
at will - that is, to impose a rule of liquidation protection against per-
217 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(c)(Il), 6 U.L.A. 487-88 (2001); see also, e.g., Dow v. Beals, 268
N.Y.S. 425, 427 (Sup. Ct. '933).
218 REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 7oi(b) (1996).
219 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 3 2(i)(d), 6 U.L.A. 404; REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 8os(5)(ii).
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sonal creditors even in the absence of a rule of liquidation protection
against owners. American courts seem to view themselves as compe-
tent to make an independent assessment of whether devices such as
the charging order are sufficient to protect the interests of personal
creditors and thereby render liquidation unnecessary.
American law has not yet taken the seemingly ultimate step of
permitting partnerships that feature strong entity shielding in perpetu-
ity rather than for just a specified term or undertaking. One possible
reason is that perpetual existence may seem inappropriate in a form in
which the identity of the individual owners is critical because each is a
presumptive firm agent. But whatever the cause, the inconvenience to
commercial actors may be slight. By the late twentieth century,
American law had developed alternatives to the partnership that were
useful to small firms and that combined strong degrees of asset parti-
tioning with the possibility of perpetual existence. We turn to those al-
ternatives now.
B. The Company Form in the United States
As with the partnership, the history of the company form in the
United States is a story of widening choices for owners and thus of
greater power for firms of all sizes to opt for strong forms of owner
and entity shielding. Although at first useful primarily to large and
capital-intensive firms, the American company form evolved into a
preferred means of legal organization for even small and closely held
businesses.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, state legisla-
tures granted charters primarily to the same kinds of firms that Par-
liament had typically allowed to incorporate: those that built and ran
canals, bridges, and turnpikes.2 20 But American states were less stingy
than Parliament in granting charters, and they were also quicker to
enact general incorporation statutes. New York led the way in i8ii,
and other states quickly followed.221
These statutes imposed restrictions on the corporate form designed
to compensate for the loss of the withdrawal right that attends strong
entity shielding. Firms were not permitted to restrict alienation of
shares,2 2 2 thereby guaranteeing shareholders an alternative source of
liquidity. And prohibitions on allocating control and income sepa-
220 See EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL I86o, at II
(,954). See generally JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917).
221 DODD, supra note 22o, at 64. Also, Massachusetts in 18o9 had enacted a statute that facili-
tated incorporation by textile mills. Blair, supra note 22, at 419 n.io8.
222 See, e.g., Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 25 Mass. 9o, 96-97 (1829); Chouteau Spring Co. v.
Harris, 20 Mo. 382, 388 (1855); Brightwell v. Mallory, 18 Tenn. (io Yer.) 196, 198 (1836).
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rately from shareholdings (such as statutory provisions restricting the
issuance of preferred stock),2 3 and on one corporation's owning the
shares of another,'2 4 sought to impede blocs of shareholders from seiz-
ing or abusing control to the disadvantage of noncontrolling share-
holders. Such forms of investor protection help explain why firms in
capital-intensive industries sought incorporation in the nineteenth cen-
tury notwithstanding the significant degree of liquidation protection
offered by the term partnership at that time.
22 5
While formal rigidities in the corporate form may have helped lar-
ger firms raise equity capital, they also made incorporation unattrac-
tive to smaller firms. Flexibility in allocating ownership, control, and
income rights is important in small firms, as is the ability to restrict
alienation of shares given that the identity of individual shareholders
can be important for firm governance. The greater risk that a small
firm will be commandeered, or incapacitated by deadlock if two or
more owners have equal holdings, also makes loss of the withdrawal
right more costly, as does the fact that an efficient market in a small
firm's shares is less likely to form. Finally, the benefits of strong entity
shielding tend to be lower when owners are fewer and thus better able
to monitor one another's patterns of personal borrowing. In these
ways, capital intensiveness, diffuse ownership, and strong entity
shielding are mutually reinforcing. Consequently, relatively few small
firms incorporated during the nineteenth century, leaving the partner-
ship as the dominant commercial entity of the period.
2 2 6
223 Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania all imposed restrictions on the
issuance of preferred stock between I87o and igoo. These restrictions chiefly consisted of re-
quirements of supermajority approval by shareholders of issuances of preferred stock (three-
quarters in Massachusetts; two-thirds in New Jersey) and limitations on the proportion of stock
that could be special or preferred. See Act of May 9, 1870, ch. 224, § 25, 1870 Mass. Acts 154,
16o-6i; Act of Apr. 7, 1875, §§ 25, 33, N.J. REV. STAT. (1875); Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 688, §
47, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1824, 1837; Act of Apr. 3, 1872, No. 28, § 1, 1872 Pa. Laws 37.
224 See De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., I75 U.S. 40, 54-55 0899)
(noting that New York statutory law then prohibited a corporation from owning the shares of an-
other, and that purchases of stock in other firms generally were considered beyond the power of a
corporation absent a specific statutory grant); accord Hazelhurst v. Savannah, Griffin & N. Ala.
R.R. Co., 43 Ga. 13, 57-58 (1871); People ex rel. Peabody v. Chi. Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E. 798, 799
(Il. 1889); Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 53 A. 842, 846 (N.J. Ch. 1903).
225 Another reason for preferring incorporation would have been its default rule of limited li-
ability, which would in turn have facilitated share tradability.
226 See Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 2o, at 6 (noting that partnerships remained the
dominant business form in the nineteenth century even in manufacturing, and that partnerships
tended to be much smaller than corporations). Partnership then, as today, would also have been a
better option for owners who wished to pledge their personal assets in support of firm debt.
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Another company-like entity - the limited partnership - was
available in most states in the nineteenth century.22 7 Like the corpora-
tion and its medieval forebear, the accomandita, the American limited
partnership allows for the separation of management from ownership,
as limited partners are not firm agents and may not participate in
management. 228 Indeed, limited partners originally could not vote on
partnership matters, making them even weaker than corporate share-
holders. 22 9 Disabling limited partners was seen as necessary to their
limited liability at a time when creditors expected that those engaged
in a firm's operations could be called to account for firm debts. As we
described in our discussion of premodern limited partnerships, how-
ever, passivity also made limited partners particularly vulnerable to
exploitation by general partners. Perhaps to compensate for this vul-
nerability, limited partners usually enjoyed a circumscribed statutory
withdrawal right, such as payout after six months' notice as long as
the firm clearly retained enough capital to pay its debts2 30 But such
attempts to balance protection of passive investors with maintenance
of going-concern value - resulting in a semi-strong form of entity
shielding - were apparently insufficient, as the limited partnership
was not widely adopted in America in the nineteenth century.
The transformation of the American company form began in the
late nineteenth century with an easing of the corporation's formal ri-
gidities, such as restrictions on the free alienability of shares.2 3 1 This
made the form more attractive to small and closely held firms, whose
rates of incorporation rose accordingly. The transformation continued
during the twentieth century, by the middle of which a closely held
business corporation could be structured with great flexibility.232
During the second half of the twentieth century, repeated cuts to
the top personal income tax rate ultimately brought it well below the
227 New York again came first, enacting a limited partnership statute in 1822. Most other
states enacted similar statutes over the next thirty years. See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT explana-
tory note, at 3 (i916).
228 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632 (West 1991 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 121-303
(McKinney Supp. 2006).
229 FRANCIS J. TROUBAT, THE LAW OF COMMANDATARY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
IN THE UNITED STATES 281-82, 294-95 (Phila., James Kay, Jun. & Bro. 1853).
230 See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § r6.
231 See, e.g., Johnston v. Laflin, 103 U.S. 8o0, 803-o4 (188o) (noting the power of firms to place
reasonable restrictions on the transfer of shares); Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, I77 N.Y.S. 873,
878 (Sup. Ct. i919) (upholding a right of first refusal in current shareholders for proposed stock
sales).
232 See, e.g., Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 145 A. 391, 393 (Me. 1929) (holding
that bylaws restricting alienation of stock, accepted with knowledge thereof, will be upheld, par-
ticularly when the restraint is for a limited period); State ex rel. Manlin v. Druggists' Addressing
Co., I13 S.W.2d io6i, IO63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (permitting "reasonable" restrictions on a share-
holder's right to transfer stock).
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corporate tax rate. The result was to make incorporation of small
firms much less attractive, and hence to create demand among small
businesses for entity forms that provided the strong entity and owner
shielding of the corporation without being taxed like one. One re-
sponse was the introduction by state legislatures of new strong entity
forms, such as the limited liability company (LLC) 233 and the statutory
business trust. Another was to graft limited liability onto the existing
partnership forms, resulting in the limited liability partnership (LLP)
and the limited liability limited partnership (LLLP).234  Among these
new forms, the LLC has proven far more popular than the LLP and
the LLLP for general enterprise, evidently in part because it provides
a stronger degree of entity shielding.
235
The LLC in its current form in fact imposes even fewer formalities
on a firm than does the corporation. But the most flexible entity of all
is the statutory business trust, which Delaware introduced in mature
form in 1988.236 While it explicitly provides for both strong entity
shielding and full limited liability,237 the business trust leaves owners
free to specify all other matters of organizational design, including con-
trol rights, allocation of earnings, and even fiduciary duties. 238 In fact,
the Delaware business trust statute does not even offer default terms
for most of these basic structural elements. The business trust effec-
tively represents the minimum required of law in creating a strong en-
tity - asset partitioning and, in particular, strong entity shielding -
and leaves the rest to be determined by contract. 239 The business trust
can thus be seen as the final step in the historical evolution of com-
mercial entities.
233 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-I to -6I (1999 & Supp. 2005); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ I7000-
17700 (West Supp. 2oo6); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. I5 6C (2004).
234 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1O to -ii ('999 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-9-100 to -1204, I4 -gA-i to -130 (2003); N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 226 (McKinney Supp. 2006).
235 The LLC, for example, allows a firm to adopt strong entity shielding in perpetuity. See
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 214, § I.04(c), at 24.
236 66 Del. Laws 514 (1988).
237 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3 803(a)-(b) (2001) (providing for limited liability for beneficial
owners and no personal liability to third parties for trustees); id. § 3805(b) ("No creditor of the
beneficial owner shall have any right to obtain possession of, or otherwise exercise legal or equita-
ble remedies with respect to, the property of the statutory trust."); id. § 3805(g) (same for trustees);
id. § 38o8(b) ("[T]he death, incapacity, dissolution, termination or bankruptcy of a beneficial
owner shall not result in the termination or dissolution of a business trust.").
238 Most provisions in Delaware's Statutory Trust Act (formerly the Business Trust Act), in-
cluding those pertaining to ownership and management structure, fiduciary duties, and the alloca-
tion of trust property, contain the qualification "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided in the
governing instrument of the statutory trust," or words to similar effect. See, e.g., id. §§ 3805(a),
38o6(a), 38o8(a).
239 The Delaware Statutory Tust Act specifies that its policy is "to give maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of governing instruments." Id.
§ 3 825(b).
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The formal restrictions on the traditional corporate form were de-
signed to protect noncontrolling shareholders from the hazards of
strong entity shielding and firm creditors from the hazards of limited
liability. The easing of these restrictions, and consequent wider use of
the company form, reflects the development of effective alternatives
for protecting both groups. As with the transformation of the partner-
ship, the new sources of protection appear to have been better infor-
mation about firms, superior accounting and valuation methods, and
greater sophistication of courts in arbitrating internal firm disputes.
The improvement in information about firms resulted from multiple
factors, including federal income tax reporting (following adoption of
the corporate income tax in 1913), mandated disclosure under stock
exchange rules and government regulation, and broader use of credit
rating agencies. Such information, when combined with the superior
valuation techniques that resulted from improvements in financial
theory and analysis, deepened equity markets and increased the effec-
tiveness of transferability of shares as a liquidity substitute for with-
drawal in smaller firms. Better information and valuation also im-
peded controlling shareholders from siphoning off firm assets through
self-dealing and fraud. For the same reasons, courts were better
equipped to rule on petitions by noncontrolling shareholders for relief
from exploitation.240  In particular, the twentieth century saw an ex-
pansion of judicial and statutory devices for protecting equity inves-
tors, such as the recognition of fiduciary duties flowing from majority
to minority owners; appraisal (that is, buyout) rights when a firm un-
dergoes a significant transaction, with shares valued by accounting
240 Contrary to the analysis we offer here, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal suggest that judicial en-
forcement of fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders and corporate managers became weaker
over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note
20, at 21-28. They argue that the shift from the partnership to the corporate form occurred de-
spite this change principally because of an increase in profitable opportunities for firms capable of
locking in capital. Id. at 28-29. The primary support they offer for this increasing legal laxity is
a claim that all transactions by corporate directors and officers involving a conflict of interest
were automatically voidable in the early nineteenth century, while courts by the late nineteenth
century had become willing to investigate the merits of such transactions before ruling on their
validity. See id. at 23-28. This doctrinal shift, if it in fact occurred, seems best explained not as
an increase in laxity, but rather - consistent with our thesis here - as the replacement of a rigid
rule with a more sophisticated standard for preventing abuse by control persons. Indeed, Lam-
oreaux and Rosenthal note that substantive judicial investigations into conflicted transactions
included comparisons of amounts paid by corporations to market prices, id. at 27, a fact suggest-
ing greater judicial comfort with financial analysis. We are, moreover, skeptical that early fiduci-
ary duty doctrine was as rigid as they suggest. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate
Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 659-66o (1992) (quoting an 1843 treatise that expressly sanctioned self-
dealing by corporate managers and directors). We note, finally, that our own view regarding the
evolution of legal oversight of corporate affairs is more consistent with Lamoreaux and Rosen-
thal's basic theory, which focuses on a subset of the factors we consider here.
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rather than liquidation sale; and "shareholder oppression" remedies -
including forced dissolution - for noncontrolling shareholders of
closely held corporations.
4 1
In general, the various factors that increased protection for noncon-
trolling shareholders - especially better information and valuation
techniques - have redounded to the benefit of noncontrolling owners
and firm creditors alike. Noncontrolling owners are in important re-
spects more vulnerable than creditors to control-person opportunism,
as the value of their residual claim on assets depends more on account-
ing and reporting practices by firm managers than does the value of
the prior and fixed claims of creditors. A firm able to attract equity
investors notwithstanding liquidation protection thus a fortiori should
be able to attract creditors notwithstanding limited liability. This
helps explain why the new strong entity forms such as the LLC and
the statutory business trust, with the virtually unrestricted freedom
they allow in structuring ownership rights, can offer limited liability as
their default rule.
Success in protecting entity creditors and investors, however, has
exacerbated another entity-related problem: the costs that profligate
entity shielding can impose on an owner's personal creditors. These
costs, and the ways courts and legislatures respond to them, will likely
shape the next chapter in the evolution of legal entities.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE UNRESOLVED
PROBLEMS OF ENTITY SHIELDING
The nearly unlimited plasticity of strong entities made possible by
contemporary U.S. business law is the inverse of Roman law's insis-
tence on the flesh-and-blood individual, and especially the pater fa-
milias, as the only legitimate holder of assets and obligor on debts. A
confluence of legal, accounting, and valuation developments, as well as
the widespread availability of low-cost credit information, have made
the costs of protecting creditors and owners manageable even for the
smallest American LLCs and closely held corporations. This conflu-
ence of factors has made contemporary America qualitatively different
in many ways from previous societies, as exemplified by the severing
of the traditional link between a business owner's enjoyment of limited
liability and his passivity - a link strong enough to persist from Ro-
man times to well into the modern era. Although Rome obviously
241 For thorough documentation of the rise of such devices for protecting shareholders, see
Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993).
Other useful sources include Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet To
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913
(1999); and Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Share-Holders' Reasonable Expecta-
tions, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988).
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lacked many of modern America's tools for protecting investors in an
enterprise, the widespread Roman institution of the peculium indicates
that Rome's courts were capable of distinguishing the assets of slave-
managed firms from the personal assets of the paterfamilias. Never-
theless, Roman law used entity shielding sparingly, apparently restrict-
ing it mostly to the specialized societas publicanorum. Whether this
reluctance to deploy entity shielding reflected a deep anticommercial
cultural norm, a low demand for legal entities, or something else re-
mains an important unanswered question.
Unlike ancient Rome, medieval Italy - an intensely commercial
society with a strong demand for credit - readily embraced weak en-
tity shielding. Yet even the Italian city-states were unwilling to go fur-
ther and adopt strong entity shielding for general-purpose commercial
firms, suggesting strongly that cost factors were binding constraints on
the supply of entity shielding. Even weak entity shielding was loca-
tional rather than firm-based in medieval Italy, evidently because the
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and the monitoring abilities of mer-
chants were necessarily local. Similarly, strong entity shielding was fa-
cilitated during the Middle Ages by the single-voyage nature of mer-
chant ventures and the clear boundaries on firm assets provided by the
hulls of merchant ships. The relationship between strong entity shield-
ing and monopoly also manifested itself in the special medieval Ge-
noese companies and formed a bridge to the joint stock companies of
the early modern period. This is a relationship that is persistent but
whose specific, cost-side mechanics demand further historical inquiry.
In England, the expanding jurisdiction of nationwide courts during
the seventeenth century dramatically reduced the cost of introducing
firm-wide weak entity shielding into partnership law, and may even
have forced this innovation as a means of reducing the costs of admin-
istering bankruptcies. Similarly, the development of markets in the
shares of chartered joint stock companies, as well as the development
of partnership and trust law, allowed entrepreneurs to create home-
made strong entities in the form of unchartered joint stock companies.
Thus, the role of declining costs is clear in the rise of entity shielding
under English law, even if an account of complex interest group poli-
tics is necessary to explain the delayed appearance of general incorpo-
ration statutes more than a century after the passage of the Bubble Act
in 1720.
It thus appears that cost factors have played a prominent role in
the development of entity shielding in every society we have investi-
gated, although in each period - and in ancient Rome in particular -
they must share the stage with other factors. A point worth noting,
however, is that in every period except that of ancient Rome, we have
been concerned chiefly with the costs and benefits of entity shielding
either to the owners and creditors of firms or to the courts. We have
focused on these particular costs and benefits because they have the
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greatest capacity to explain the rise of entity shielding in the West over
the last millennium. But the case of the Roman peculium, which may
not have had entity shielding, is a reminder that entity shielding affects
not only a firm's creditors, but also the personal creditors of the firm's
owners. Moreover, it is the costs that entity shielding imposes on per-
sonal creditors that provide a point of intersection between the Roman
peculium and the flexible rules of entity formation found in the con-
temporary United States.
These particular costs arise because entity shielding subordinates
the claims to entity assets of an individual's personal creditors without
obtaining their consent or even, indeed, giving them specific notice.
This feature of entity shielding is why it requires organizational law
rather than just contract, and why it is so effective in solving the
transaction cost and moral hazard problems that would otherwise at-
tend the creation of the pattern of creditors' rights seen in contempo-
rary business forms. But the ability to impair the interests of personal
creditors without their consent is also why entity shielding presents a
greater opportunism hazard than does owner shielding, including lim-
ited liability in particular. It is relatively easy to ensure that creditors
know in advance that they are dealing with a limited liability entity,
thereby enabling them to adjust the interest rate they charge and to
impose contractual limitations on the entity's structure and conduct.
The experience of the past two centuries has established the effective-
ness of legal rules that assist entity creditors in forming and protecting
their expectations regarding firm assets. But the subordination of per-
sonal creditors without notice presents different and perhaps thornier
problems. These problems have not been central to the evolution of
organizational law in the past, since they are strongly constrained in
firms with multiple owners and relatively rigid structures. However,
the increasing freedom in entity creation has brought them to the fore.
Two important manifestations of these problems are already appar-
ent: the rise of elaborate group structures with tangles of entities that
mar the transparency of business enterprises, and the increasing use of
entity forms by wealthy individuals to thwart the legitimate claims of
personal creditors. Consider the first of these - the increasing occur-
rence of unitary enterprises subpartitioned into hundreds or even thou-
sands of separate asset pools, each protected by some degree of entity
shielding. As the recent bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom dem-
onstrate, this subpartitioning of assets and liabilities into entities con-
trolled by the firm but often absent from the firm's balance sheet
greatly diminishes investors' ability to evaluate the firm's financial
condition. An elevated risk of fraud is one cost of such profligate asset
partitioning. A second, equally important cost is that unsecured lend-
ers to parent companies face increased difficulty in monitoring the as-
sets that bond their claims. A third cost is the heightened complexity
of bankruptcy proceedings, in which courts must reconcile the compet-
14012oo6]
HeinOnline  -- 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1401 2005-2006
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ing claims of the parent company's creditors and the creditors of hun-
dreds of subsidiaries.
One response to these costs is the unsettled doctrine of substantive
consolidation, by which a bankruptcy court sets aside part or all of the
subsidiary structure of a corporate group, and thus in effect scales
back or entirely cancels asset partitioning within the overall asset
poo1.2 42 Another response with a similar effect is to override the sub-
sidiary structure of a corporate group by making security in all of a
group's subsidiaries available for debtor-in-possession financing, a
measure that benefits the enterprise as a whole at the expense of those
creditors who relied upon the entity status of individual subsidiaries.243
Just as the administrative costs of bankruptcy played a critical role in
the emergence of strong entity shielding three centuries ago, bank-
ruptcy law is likely to set limits on entity shielding and entity prolif-
eration within today's corporate groups. It is critical, however, that
when bankruptcy courts apply entity-trimming doctrines such as sub-
stantive consolidation, they do so with a healthy appreciation for the
history and economic functions of entity shielding.
The second manifestation of the notice problem implicates a some-
what different set of costs - the costs of debtor opportunism vis-a-vis
individual creditors. Recall from Part IV that Roman law may have
withheld entity shielding from the peculium, an institution that limited
the liability of the pater familias for the debts of a slave-managed
business. As we argue above, the presumptive reason why entity
shielding might have been withheld was to guard against the risk that
a failing Roman patriarch would stuff his personal assets into the
businesses of his sons and slaves to the detriment of his personal credi-
tors. But precisely this maneuver has today become increasingly easy
for well-heeled and legally sophisticated American burghers. States
now compete in offering to households "asset protection trusts,"
mechanisms designed to make entity shielding available to frustrate
personal creditors.2 44 The availability of such vehicles raises the ques-
tion whether, in the twenty-first-century world of easy entities, the
venerable safeguards against fraudulent transfers go far enough to pro-
tect personal creditors. Again, the response to this kind of opportunis-
tic use of entity shielding may have to come through federal bank-
242 See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 316 BR. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), rev'd, 419 F.3 d 195 (3d
Cir. 2005) (invoking the substantive consolidation doctrine to void subsidiary cross-guarantees of
parent debt benefiting bank creditors at the expense of tort creditors).
243 See, e.g., In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., 250 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 2001) (extending debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing to an entire group, although particular subsidiaries may not require
financing, with the use of the group's assets as collateral for superpriority DIP financing).
244 See Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations,
3o DEL. J. CORP. L. 199 (2oo5); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competi-
tion for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005).
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ruptcy law, although the most recent amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act are not heartening in this respect.1
45
These observations imply that although the law has successfully
addressed one constraint on the formation of strong entities - the
need to protect entity creditors and investors - it is just beginning the
task of sorting through a second constraint: the need to protect third-
party creditors unaffiliated with the entity itself. This task may ulti-
mately require a rich and subtle jurisprudence, both inside and outside
of bankruptcy. We expect these problems of entity shielding to play a
dominant role in the next phase of the evolution of organizational law.
245 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. iog-
8, ii9 Stat. 23 (amending scattered sections of ii U.S.C.), generally strengthens the position of
creditors at the expense of consumer debtors, in large part by shifting individual cases from Chap-
ter 7 to Chapter 3. Despite the crackdown on consumer debtors, however, nothing in the 2005
Act affects the limits of asset protection trusts, except the extension of the Bankruptcy Code's
fraudulent conveyance "reachback" provision from one to two years. See id. § 1402, ii9 Stat. at
214-15.
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